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THE ILLINOIS "TWO-TIER" JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY
SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS AND COUNTING
FRANK GREENBERG*

The two-tiered judicial disciplinary system in Illinois, created by the
1970 Constitution, was, at the time it was adopted, and largely remains, a
unique departure from the more familiar model, of which California may be
said to be the prototype, in which both the investigative and prosecutorial
function and the adjudicative function are combined within one agency
usually called a "Judicial Qualifications Commission." The commission in
California and its counterparts in a great majority of the other jurisdictions
are typically a part of the state judicial system. The disciplinary sanctions
recommended by these commissions are subject to review by the state
supreme court.
Illinois, by contrast, has divorced the disciplinary system from the
judicial system, has separated the investigative and prosecutorial function
from the adjudicative function and allocated these powers between two
independent constitutionally created agencies-a Judicial Inquiry Board and
a Courts Commission. 1 The disciplinary system has been so structured as to
insulate both the Board and the Courts Commission from any significant
degree of control by the judicial, executive and legislative branches of the
government.
BACKGROUND

It seems necessary at the outset of this article to understand something
of the forces-perhaps peculiarly a part of the Illinois experience in dealing
with judicial misconduct and disability-which impelled this departure from
the more usual "Judicial Qualifications Commission" model and shaped the
"two-tier" or "bifurcated" disciplinary system.
I can make no more than brief reference, here, to the events preceding
the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention which drafted the 1970 Con2
stitution.
* J.D., University of Chicago Law School; president of the Chicago Bar Association,
1969-70; member of the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board since it was organized in 1971. A portion
of this article is drawn from Mr. Greenberg's keynote address to the Fifth National Conference
of Judicial Disciplinary Commissions held in Bal Harbour, Florida, March 31-April 4, 1976, and
an adaptation of the address which appeared as The Task of Judging the Judges, 59 JUD. 458

(1976).
1. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, §' 15. See Appendix A.
2. The ground is well covered by R. COHN, To JUDGE wrrTH JUSTICE (1973) [hereinafter
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Until 1964, the history of judicial discipline in Illinois was a barren
one. Although the remedies of impeachment and legislative concurrent
resolution were theoretically available for the removal of a judge, history
records no instance in which an Illinois judge was removed from office by
either of these methods or by the older form of legislative address, which is
a formal request by the legislature to the Governor that a judge be removed.
In 1832 the Illinois House of Representatives voted articles of impeachment
against Justice Theophilus W. Smith of the Illinois Supreme Court, charging
him with "high misdemeanors." His trial before the Illinois Senate resulted
in acquittal and a subsequent effort to remove him by address failed. In 1843
the Illinois House of Representatives voted articles of impeachment against
Justice Browne of the Illinois Supreme Court and he, too, was acquitted by
the Senate. The proceedings against Justice Browne were apparently the last
3
attempt to remove an Illinois judge by impeachment.
A constitutional amendment (the 1962 Judicial Article), adopted in
1962 with effect on January 1, 1964, 4 created a commission composed
exclusively of five judges appointed by the supreme court and the appellate
court, authorized to hear and determine complaints against judges. 5 The
commission was empowered to retire judges for disability and to impose the
sanctions of removal or suspension without pay "for cause." Unfortunately, the constitutional provisions as implemented by the supreme court left a
great deal to be desired. 6 The commission was not permanently convened; it
could be called into action only by the chief justice on order of the supreme
court or at the request of the Illinois Senate. Despite a belated effort in June
19697 to restructure the commission into a permanently convened body with
an investigative staff and an orderly procedure for the initiation and prosecution of charges, it never had much chance to succeed.
cited as COHN]; Cohn, The Illinois JudicialDepartment-ChangesEffected by the Constitution
of 1970, 1971 ILL. L.F. 355 [hereinafter cited as The Illinois Judicial Department]; and W.
BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? (1970) [hereinafter cited as BRAITHWAITE]. These
publications are "required reading" in order to understand the background of the present
Illinois judicial disciplinary system.
See also G. FIEDLER, THE ILLINOIS LAW COURTS IN THREE CENTURIES 1673-1973 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as FIEDLER] (This book is a remarkably complete documentary history of the
Illinois courts. It contains the text of many documents in the area of judicial discipline which
are otherwise unpublished and difficult of access).
3. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 96-97, and FIEDLER, supra note 2, at 314.
4. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI (amended 1962) [hereinafter the 1962 Judicial Article].
5. Id. §18.
6. For an insight into the shortcomings of the Illinois Courts Commission under the 1962
Judicial Article and a brief history of judicial discipline in Illinois prior to 1970, see BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2.
7. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, § 51 (1969) (Sup. Ct. R. 51). This rule was rescinded
effective July 1, 1971, and replaced by sections 15(e) through (g) of Article VI of the new
constitution. See ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI §§ 15(e)-(g). These sections provided a new and
expanded constitutional basis for the Illinois Courts Commission.
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In the summer of 1969, prior to the adoption of the revised rule, 8 the
supreme court, confronted with serious charges of misconduct against the
then chief justice and an associate justice of the court, 9 found it necessary to
bypass the existing Courts Commission. The court, publicly acknowledging
that an investigation of the charges by a commission controlled by the court
would inevitably encounter public skepticism and distrust, 10 appointed an ad
hoc special commission of five lawyers to conduct an investigation into the
charges." The commission's report led to the resignation of the two justices.
It would probably have made no difference even if the June 1969 rule
change had been adopted before the supreme court was faced with widely
publicized charges against two of its own justices. The effort at shoring up
by the 1962 Judicial
the inadequacies of the Courts Commission created
12
late.
too
and
little
too
event,
any
in
Article was,
These events occurred fortuitously just months before the constitutional
convention convened in December 1969. It was quickly evident that the
system of exclusive judicial control of judicial discipline had lost the
the people, and a substantial majority of the
confidence of the organized bar,
13
delegates to the convention.
The bar's pervasive dissatisfaction with the way in which the disciplinary system under the 1962 Judicial Article had functioned, or, more
accurately, had failed to function, was evident in the joint proposal submitted
to the constitutional convention by the Chicago Bar Association and the
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, § 51 (1969) (Sup. Ct. R. 51).
9. See FIEDLER, supra note 2, at 314.
10. See Report of the Special Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois in the Matter
of the Special Commission in Relation to No. 39797, Appendix E (June 18, 1969) (unpublished);
seealso FIEDLER, supra note 2, at 317.
11. The author of this article served as chairman of the 1969 special commission.
12. Rubin G. Cohn describes the situation in these terms:
For some time prior to the unfortunate events in the summer of 1969, the constitutional provisions and implementing supreme court rule had been recognized as
structurally and procedurally inadequate. The courts commission was an ad hoc
body convened to hear a particular charge; it had no continuity ot existence or
authority. Procedurally, the constitution gave no administrative, investigative, or
enforcement staff to the commission, and the initial supreme court rule sketchily
outlined the essentials of a proceeding against a judge.
The Illinois Judicial Department, supra note 2, at 379.
13. One of the stark facts of overriding importance underscored by the events of
June-September 1969 was that the Illinois Courts Commission, a creature of the 1962
judicial amendment and the subject of intensive study and implementation by supreme court rule during the period antecedent and concurrent with the drama, was
completely denied any investigative and disciplinary role. Indeed, supreme court
judgment determined that the commission was an inappropriate body to investigate
the allegations of judicial misconduct. However one viewed the supreme court
decision to bypass the courts commission and establish a special commission, to both
public and professional minds, the courts commission as structured became suspect
as an effective mechanism of judicial discipline.
The Illinois Judicial Department, supra note 2, at 381.
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Illinois State Bar Association. 14 The joint bar proposal suggested the creation of an independent disciplinary commission consisting of four lawyers
and three non-lawyers with power to investigate charges, conduct hearings,
and impose sanctions of censure, suspension with or without pay, or removal from office. The commission's decision, while appealable to the supreme
court, was not to be reversed, modified or remanded absent a finding by the
court that it was "clearly erroneous." It would thus have excluded participation by judges in the decision-making process of the commission and
severely limited appellate review. As Rubin G. Cohn observes, "[t]he bar
associations' proposal reflected almost with a vengeance the rapidly developing conviction that judges could not be trusted to judge their own colleagues in matters of discipline."' 5
It may be, as Cohn suggests, that the joint bar proposal was as much an
overreaction to the widely publicized "crisis of confidence" in the judiciary
as the implacable opposition by the judiciary to any change that would
invade its exclusive control of the disciplinary process. 6 It is, at any rate, a
fair measure of the intense controversy which quickly engaged the constitutional convention over "who should judge the judges."
However disparate the views of the bar and the judiciary were, the need
was clear. It is described in the Majority Report of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Convention as follows:
The problem of discipline and removal of judges, it is fair to
say, has literally exploded upon the public consciousness in Illinois and elsewhere . . . .Perhaps at no time in the history of
this State has this issue been a matter of such great public discus14. Illinois Constitutional Convention, Member Proposal No. 424. Rubin G. Cohn is
inclined to be critical of what he sees as a lack of preparation by the bar for the constitutional
convention and belated "feverish haste and urgency." His perception of the situation is, at this
point, inaccurate. There had been a great deal of quiet discussion and preparation for the
submission of a revised judicial article before the summer of 1969. But it was only in the
aftermath of the "affair of the two justices of the supreme court" that the leadership of the bar
associations became convinced that there was, for the first time, a good chance for the "bill of
divorcement" of judicial discipline from exclusive control by the judiciary. The task of
obtaining a resounding and virtually unanimous endorsement of the proposal by both bar
associations, without which it would have stood no chance in the constitutional convention,
was not a simple one. It was only when the groundwork had been carefully laid that the
proposal was submitted to an extraordinary meeting of the Board of Managers of the Chicago
Bar Association and the Board of Governors of the Illinois State Bar Association-perhaps
the first and last time the two bodies met in joint session. The proposal was approved and was
subsequently embodied in Member Proposal 424 in the Convention. See COHN, supranote 2, at
27-30.
15. THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, supra note 2, at 384.
16. Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court undoubtedly reflected the
views of the Judiciary in this statement submitted to the Judiciary Committee of the Constitutional Convention:
The only rational justification for elaborate provisions concerning the policing of the
judicial system is that judges are venal beyond other men, and for that reason they
cannot be trusted to determine when disciplinary action should be taken. . . .I hate
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sion and concern. Public confidence in the honesty and integrity
of the judicial system is a factor absolutely central to a free
society . . . . [Tihere has been a serious erosion of public confidence in our courts . . . . The restoration of that confidence is a
categorical imperative. 17
THE Two-TIER SYSTEM

In meeting this challenge the constitutional convention fashioned a
compromise between the bar proposals and the judiciary's desire for retention of the status quo. 18 The 1970 Constitution' 9 deliberately bypassed both
the supreme court and the legislature, and created two independent agencies-a Judicial Inquiry Board2" which is entrusted with the investigative
and prosecutorial function, and a Courts Commission which is entrusted
with the adjudicative function. Both the Board and the Courts Commission
find their mandates within the constitution itself.21 No provision is made for
implementation by the supreme court or the legislature and none is required
beyond compliance by the General Assembly with the obligation to "appropriate funds for the operation of the Board" 22 and to "provide by law for the
expenses of the Cornmission. "23
As amply demonstrated by the proceedings of the convention, this
severance of the Board and the Courts Commission from the executive,
judicial and legislative branches of the government (except for appointment
of members of the Board by the Governor and the supreme court, and
selection of the members of the Courts Commission) was not in any sense
accidental.
The JudicialInquiry Board
The Judicial Inquiry Board consists of nine members-three lawyers,
four non-lawyers and two judges. The lawyer and non-lawyer members are
appointed by the Governor for four-year terms and may not serve more than
eight years. No more than two of the lawyers and two of the non-lawyers

to think of the future consequences that may result from a constitutional provision
that can only be explained to successive generations of high school students on the
ground that our judicial system is not to be trusted.
VI PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 917-18 (1970).
17. Id at 860.
18. This is not to suggest that the joint bar proposal was the only one submitted to the

Judiciary Committee of the Constitutional Convention. There were a round dozen of other
member proposals ranging as Cohn reports, "over a wide spectrum of choice and detail" but
the bar proposal was the "most provocative and seriously debated." COHN, supra note 2, at 68.
19. For convenience, § 15 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 is reproduced in
Appendix A.
20. Hereinafter referred to in the text and the footnotes as the Board.
21. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, §§ 15(b), (e).
22. Id.§ 15(d).
23. Id. § 15 (g).
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may be members of the same political party. The two judges are selected by
the supreme court from among the circuit judges of the state. The Board is
convened permanently with authority "to conduct investigations, receive or
initiate complaints concerning a Judge or Associate Judge, and file complaints with the Courts Commission. "24 The filing of a complaint requires
concurrence of five members.
The Board has no power or authority to determine a judge's guilt or
innocence of any charge or complaint made against him. It has, in fact, no
constitutional authority to decide anything except the question of whether a
"reasonable basis" exists to charge the judge, by the filing of a complaint
with the Courts Commission, with:
-willful misconduct in office;
-persistent failure to perform his duties;
-- conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
-- conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute;
-physical or mental inability to perform his duties.2
The authority to decide guilt or innocence and to impose any sanction
or discipline is carefully reserved to the Courts Commission. When the
Board files a complaint with the commission the charges are tried de novo
before the commission in an adversary public hearing in which the Board
has the role of prosecutor and the respondent is afforded the full panoply of
adjudicative due process. The Board has authority to adopt rules governing
its procedures and has subpoena power and authority to appoint and direct
its staff. 26 As already noted, the General Assembly is required to appropriate
27
funds for the Board's operation.
The Board's investigations are initiated on the basis of complaints or
other communications, oral or written, from members of the public, items
which appear in the news media, or other information which comes to the
attention of the Board. A person who "complains" to the Board about a
judge does not thereby acquire standing as the "complainant" in the case.
The ultimate complainant is the Board itself. If the Board is moved, after
preliminary screening, to initiate an investigation, it is the Board's investigation and the complaint that may result from the investigation is the
Board's complaint.
The information which may initiate an investigation need not be under
oath or even in the form of a written communication. The Board seeks to
make itself readily accessible to the public and each communication received by the Board, whatever its source, is examined by each member of
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. § 15(c).
Id.
Id. § 15 (g).
See note 22 supra.
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the Board. It is, of course, true that a great majority of such communications
do not survive preliminary screening and do not justify a formal investigation. But when there is reason for investigation, it is the Board that initiates
the process and ultimately determines whether there is "reasonable basis"
for the filing of a complaint with the Courts Commission.
The Board's staff consists of an Executive Director, two full-time
investigators, a full-time administrative assistant-secretary at its office in
Chicago and a part-time secretary at its office in Springfield.
The Board issues, quarterly, a statistical summary of the disposition of
matters which come before it-which is probably as close as it may come,
without breaching the confidentiality of its proceedings, to describing the
results of its proceedings. 28 Except, of course, as the complaints it files with
the Courts Commission and the commission's decisions, both of which are
29
public, reflect those cases in which the Board has taken affirmative action.
The Courts Commission
The Courts Commission, in contrast tothe Board, consists entirely of
judges-one supreme court justice who is selected by that court and who
serves as the commission's chairman, two appellate court judges who are
appointed by that court, and two circuit judges who are selected by the
supreme court. Although three of the five judges of the commission are
appointed by the supreme court, the commission, no less than the Board,
has been freed of control or direction by the court. It is entitled to its own
appropriation from the General Assembly and may adopt its own rules of
procedure.
The Courts Commission is permanently convened to hear complaints
filed by the Board. A complaint must be proved by "clear and convincing
evidence" (the standard adopted by the commission in its rules) and the
commission has authority to impose a broad spectrum of sanctions consisting of reprimand, censure, suspension with or without pay, and removal
from office. The concurrence of three members of the commission is
28. A summary (Table I) of the disposition of matters by the Board and a summary (Table
II) of dispositions by the Courts Commission of complaints filed by the Board for the period
1971-1976 appears in Appendix B. The tables are an adaptation of the Board's regular quarterly
statistical summaries.
29. It would be instructive to make a critical analysis and an effort at a synthesis of the
cases which have thus far been decided by the Courts Commission, but that awaits another
occasion and perhaps another author. Unfortunately, the decisions of the commission (the
commission calls them "orders") are not readily available in published form, although copies
may be obtained from the secretary of the commission. For reasons which are unclear, the
commission has declined suggestions that it arrange for publication of its decisions or orders as
a supplement to the regular Illinois Supreme Court or appellate court reports or in some other
form that would make them more accessible to the bench, the bar and the public, as well as to
the judicial disciplinary agencies in other jurisdictions.

76

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

necessary for a decision. There is no appeal from the decision of the
commission. The commission has recognized the fact that both the Board
and the commission are "outside the ordinary judicial system and the
decision of the

.

.

. Commission is final.'"30

THE ENDS WHICH OUGHT TO BE SERVED BY THE
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM

Any effort at an evaluation of what I deem to be the principal advantages of the Illinois system as compared to the more usual commission form
necessarily involves an appreciation of the ends which ought to be served by
the judicial disciplinary system. Obviously no governmental system is good
or bad except as it conduces to the accomplishment of the needs which call
it into existence.
On this point, however, I am not sure that there is any real consensus or
that my own perception of the ends that ought to be served by the system is
any more than a deeply felt personal conviction. There is, of course, also the
caveat which must be offered that not all states have had quite the same
problems as Illinois on the road toward a viable system of judicial discipline. What may be required in Illinois may not be necessary in states with a
less turbulent history of judicial reform or where there is a more sensible
method of selecting judges. 3 But it is required, if my evaluation of the
Illinois system is to be understood in proper context, that I submit my own
view of what the judicial disciplinary system is about.
I perceive the ends to be five: (1) to gain and maintain public respect
for the judiciary; (2) to bring about an increased awareness among the bench
and bar of the consequences of violation of the norms of judicial conduct;
(3) to teach judges what is expected of them through case-by-case decisions;
(4) to deter misconduct; and (5) to remove from office judges who have
been unfaithful to their trust or who have become physically or mentally
unable to perform their duties.
Respect for and obedience to law cannot be expected unless the exercise of judicial power is accepted as legitimate. I hold, therefore, that the
raison d'etre of the judicial disciplinary system is the imperative that the
people shall have confidence in their judiciary. The way to gain and
maintain that confidence is to demonstrate to the people that when judicial
misconduct or disability does occur, there is a viable institution-the judi30. In re Harrod, No. 76-CC-3 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n December 3, 1976) at 3.
31. A half century of repeated effort by the organized bar in Illinois has not, as yet,
succeeded in obtaining merit selection at any level of the judiciary. The state clings to that now
quaint relic of Jacksonian democracy, partisan political election of its judges. Illinois is also

Chicago and Chicago is the place where one of its most influential aldermen gave us the
deathless dictum that "Chicago ain't ready for reform." The strong Democratic machine which
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cial disciplinary system-that can cope with it, with courage and independence and scrupulous impartiality.
Unfortunately, that public confidence is not attainable when the disciplinary system is wholly within the control of the judiciary itself. Whether
justified or not, such a system attracts doubt and public skepticism which is
mitigated only to the extent that there is a participation in the system by nonjudges as well as judges. Nor is public confidence attainable unless the
system operates with as much visibility as can be accommodated to the
equally obvious need for confidentiality at the investigative stage of the
process. As an old aphorism has it, "justice must be done but it must also be
seen to be done." Those who think that confidence can be gained by
cloaking judicial misconduct behind a Potemkin facade are sadly mistaken.
The disciplinary system can help to bring about a heightened awareness
on the part of the bench and bar of the consequences of violation of the
norms of judicial conduct, with a profound psychological impact on the
community of judges, the community of lawyers, and the larger community
of consumers of justice. The point is well expressed by Irving R. Kaufman,
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
a plea for the vigorous exposure of lawyers' misconduct. 32 While his
remarks were addressed to lawyer discipline, they are equally applicable to
judicial discipline. Judge Kaufman quotes the sociologist and philosopher,
Emile Durkheim, who, as he explains, "first theorized that exposing illegal
or unethical conduct heightens the common conscience." 33 Deviance, when
revealed, contributes to the revival and maintenance of common sentiments
by arousing the community to the consequences of violating fundamental
norms. The exposure of misconduct, Durkheim has emphasized, "brings
together upright consciences and concentrates them.' 34
If that seems a bit esoteric, I think the Maryland Supreme Court had
much the same idea in mind when it said, in disbarring Spiro Agnew, that
"[d]isciplinary proceedings have been established. . . not for punishment
but rather as a catharsis for the profession and a prophylactic for the
public."'35
The work of the judicial disciplinary agencies can also have a teaching
value of inestimable importance. In the area of judicial ethics, as in other

has dominated Chicago for many years is vitally concerned with the selection of judges as a
patronage tool. It is not surprising that the same forces which see merit selection as an
intolerable threat to the partisan political apparatus, display about the same degree of enthusiasm for an independent judicial disciplinary system.
32. Kaufman, Attacking Anomie in the Legal Profession, I LMGATION 5 (1975).
33. Id. at 6.
34. Id.
35. Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974).
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areas of our law, precedents and doctrines are largely shaped on a case-bycase basis. Nobody can write an all-inclusive manual which tells judges, in
every conceivable instance, what is expected of them. The constitutional
standards of willful misconduct in office, conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice, and conduct that brings the judicial office into
disrepute, while not vulnerable to the challenge of vagueness or overbreath, 36 are neither fully self-explanatory nor always adequate guides to
the demarcation between the permissible and the impermissible. It is therefore necessary that these broad statements not only be illuminated and
informed by the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct or
other codes adopted in various states, but be explicated in decisions of the
disciplinary agencies and the state supreme courts. Such decisions can serve
to evolve a body of doctrine which will sharpen the application of the
constitutional standards to specific ethical problems.
The necessity for a "common law" of judicial conduct is all the greater
because the state supreme courts have evidenced some reluctance to formulate specific codes of conduct. Although one can appreciate and sympathize
with a reluctance to attempt to meet an endless catalog of specific fact
situations by rules, the absence of clear-cut answers to a large number of
recurring problems lends emphasis to the teaching value of case-by-case
decisions.
The judicial disciplinary system also has obvious deterrent value. Its
very existence is a deterrent to misconduct and an incentive to judges
suffering from physical or mental disability to retire as gracefully as possible. But I rank deterrence relatively low in the values I ascribe to the
disciplinary system. If the only way to enforce compliance with norms of
judicial conduct is in terrorem, the battle is already lost. It is not by the
threat of disciplinary sanctions alone that judges can be won to virtue, but
rather by seeking their heightened awareness of what is expected of them.
This is not accomplished by brandishing the sword, but rather through
candid disclosure of fault where it exists, and the firm imposition of public
discipline whenever it is deserved.
All of these values or goals have one thing in common. None of them
can be accomplished unless the disciplinary process has an appropriate
degree of visibility; they cannot be achieved if corrective or disciplinary
measures are hidden from view. While an informal remonstrance or reprimand may correct a fault in a single judge, it does nothing to enlighten his
brethren about what is required of them. Nor does it promote the credibility
of the disciplinary system.

36. See text accompanying notes 55-67 infra.
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ILLINOIS V. CALIFORNIA

What I see as a number of advantages in the Illinois system may be
illuminated by comparing it to the more prevalent "commission form" of
37
which California is generally regarded as the classic prototype .
The California commission is composed of five judges appointed by
the supreme court, two lawyers appointed by the governing body of the state
bar, and two non-lawyers appointed by the Governor with the concurrence
of the senate. The commission combines within itself the functions which in
Illinois are allocated between the Judicial Inquiry Board and the Courts
Commission, although the California commission's adjudicatory power is
subject to the revisory jurisdiction of the supreme court. The California
Constitution provides that on recommendation of the commission
the Supreme Court may 1) retire a judge for disability that seriously interferes with the performance of his duties or is likely to
become permanent, and 2) censure or remove a judge for action
. . . that constitutes wilful misconduct in office, wilful and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
judicial office into disrepute.3 8
If the California commission decides, after "preliminary investigation" to charge a judge with misconduct or disability, it institutes "formal
proceedings" of an adversary nature. 39 The preliminary investigation and
the charging decision immediately prior to the formal proceedings are
analogous to the function of the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board; the written
notice to the judge of the institution of formal proceedings is like the
complaint filed by the Illinois Board with the Illinois Courts Commission;
and the "formal proceedings" are analogous to the hearing by the Illinois
Courts Commission. There are several differences, however.
(1) In California's preliminary investigation, the judge is notified of
the investigation, the nature of the charge, and the name of the person, if
any, who made the verified statement which triggered the investigation. A
verified statement is, however, not required and the California commission
may make the investigation on its own motion.
In Illinois, the Judicial Inquiry Board need not notify the judge of the
investigation (although it frequently does so) and it need not serve notice
upon him of the nature of the charges until the investigation has come to the
37. The California Judicial Qualification Commission [hereinafter referred to in the text as
the California commission] was established in 1960 and pioneered the development of the
judicial disciplinary system as we presently know it. Its name has now been changed to the
more descriptive "Commission on Judicial Performance."
38. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c).
39. CAL. CT. R. 905 (1971).
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point at which there is reason to believe that there may be a reasonable basis
for a complaint to the Courts Commission. Investigations are often closed
without the judge ever knowing that somebody has complained about him.
However, when it appears that the investigation may result in a complaint,
the Board sends the judge what it calls its "rule 4(d) notice," apprising him
of the charges that may be made against him and inviting him to appear
before the Board (with counsel, if he so elects) to give such information,
including the names of witnesses he may wish to have heard by the Board,
as he desires. In the matter of notification to the judge that he is the subject
of investigation, the difference between Illinois and California may be more
apparent than real. William Braithwaite's study of the California procedures
suggests that in practice the California commission often withholds the
notice until it has determined "that a prima facie valid complaint does
indeed have some factual basis.' ' In both Illinois and California the
safeguards of adjudicatory due process attach only after the investigation is
completed. In Illinois, this occurs when a complaint is filed with the Courts
Commission; in California, it occurs at the time that "formal proceedings"
are instituted.
(2) In Illinois, the alleged misconduct surfaces when a complaint is
filed by the Board with the Courts Commission; in California, not until the
commission, after completion of the "formal proceedings," has arrived at a
recommendation of discipline, and has filed a record in the supreme court.
Illinois' disclosure of the complaint when it is filed with the Courts Commission, and the public nature of the hearing or trial by the Commission, is,
in my opinion, greatly to be preferred to California's maintenance of secrecy
until an affirmative recommendation is made by the commission to the
supreme court. I rest this mainly on the extent to which these several modes
are apt to contribute to public confidence in the judicial institution.
(3) Illinois has divorced judicial discipline from the judicial system
and legislative authority; California's commission operates under rules
adopted by the Judicial Council of California and with powers granted by
statute. 41 I have said, frankly, that I believe that judicial discipline is too
important to be left solely to the judges. It is, admittedly, a controversial
subject but the trend of the times seems to me to support my misgivings
about exclusive control of judicial discipline by the judiciary. Aside from
whatever peculiarities we have had with the Illinois experience in dealing
with judicial misconduct and disability, I think that the goal of public
confidence is best served by a sharing of power between the judiciary and its
customers.
40. See BRArrHwArm,
supra note 2, at 88.
41. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(e); CAL. CT. R. 901-922 (1977); CAL. Gov'T CODE §
68701-68755 (West 1976).
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(4) While the California commission has a vital adjudicatory role, its
determination, after a full adversary hearing, ends up as a recommendation
to the supreme court which it may accept, modify or reject.
In Illinois, the decision of the Courts Commission is final and is not
reviewable by the supreme court. While the ultimate decision-making power, in both states, is vested in judges, the distinction is, I think, a crucial
one. The Illinois Courts Commission acts as a tribunal separate from, and
independent of, the courts system, deriving its mandate directly from the
constitution. That does, or should, have an impact on its perception of the
role it is expected to play in the disciplinary process. I do not suggest that
the California Supreme Court is any less accountable to the people of the
state than the Courts Commission, but I think that the separation is desirable, not only in Illinois but in other jurisdictions, in order to ensure the
42
effective functioning of the judicial disciplinary system.
(5) The California commission is rather obviously proud of the number of informal and unpublicized "adjustments" it has effected in administering the judicial disciplinary system. The impetus toward "informal,"
nonpublic disposition of cases of "less serious" judicial misconduct may
have come from the fact that California initially provided for no sanction
except removal from office. It was not until 1966 that censure was added to
removal as an authorized sanction, and that the phrase "conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute"
was added to the constitutional definition of judicial misbehavior. 4 3 The

42. Having the ultimate adjudicative power in the state supreme court becomes particularly embarrassing when charges are made against members of that court. A special tribunal must
then be convened to substitute for the court. Florida has recently had that experience with
serious charges brought against Justices Hal P. Dekle and Joseph A. Boyd, Jr. A special panel
consisting of two retired supreme court justices, four circuit court judges, and a district court
judge rejected the recommendation of the Judicial Qualifications Commission that the two
justices be removed from office and limited the measure of discipline to a reprimand. See In re
Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Hal P. Dekle), 308 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1975), and In re Inquiry
Concerning a Judge (Joseph A. Boyd, Jr.), 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975). The decision created a
furor in the Florida legislature and the news media. An editorial in the St. Petersburg Times, for
example, spoke of "this black day for the courts of Florida," characterized the special panel as
one "picked by the majority political clique on the [supreme] court itself," and said that the
"Boyd-Dekle episode clearly demonstrated that the process of disciplining both lawyers and
judges should be removed from the hands of the Supreme Court." St. Petersburg Times, Feb.
5, 1975, § A, at 16, col. 1.
In 1977, the California Supreme Court was faced with a recommendation by the Commission on Judicial Performance that 82-year-old Associate Justice Marshall F. McComb be
removed for misconduct. A special tribunal of seven court of appeals judges selected by lot was
substituted for the supreme court. It overruled the recommendation of the Commission on
Judicial Qualifications that Justice McComb be removed from office and more charitably
ordered his retirement. See McComb v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 19 Cal. 3d Spec.
Trib. Supp. 1, 564 P.2d 1, 138 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1977).
43. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c).
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necessity for fashioning some sanction for misconduct less draconian than
removal from office may have been the mother of invention.
A recent constitutional amendment" now authorizes the California
commission to admonish a judge privately about improper action or dereliction of duty. It also broadens "habitual intemperance," as a ground for
discipline, to include the use of intoxicants or drugs.
Even in cases of the most serious kinds of judicial misconduct, one
reads the literature about California with the sense that the objective of the
disciplinary system is simply the separation from office of a judge who has
been guilty of misconduct as discreetly, tactfully, and, above all, as secretly
45
as possible.
As I have already suggested, the public interest is not served by
cloaking in secrecy those remedial measures that are a justifiable response to
judicial misconduct. "Publicity," as Mr. Justice Louis D. Brandeis once
wrote, "is justly commended as a remedy for social. . . diseases. Sunlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.'

6

(6) In California, the same nine persons who comprise the commission make both the charging decision and the determination of guilt, although the "sentence," so to speak, is imposed by the supreme court on the
commission's recommendation.
In Illinois, the Judicial Inquiry Board makes only the charging decision
and a completely independent body, the Courts Commission, makes the
determination of guilt and the measure of discipline.
While there is obviously some internal separation of these functions
within the California commission, it seems to me the better part of wisdom,
as well as consonant with recent developments in the area of administrative
law, to allocate the functions between two independent agencies as the
44. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
45. Much of the claimed -success of the California commission lies in its ability to
"motivate" a judge to "voluntarily" resign or retire without a public airing of the charges
against him. One observer credits the early effectiveness of the commission "largely to the
indirect pressure it exerts on the judiciary." Buckley, The Commission on JudicialQualifications: An Attempt to Deal with Judicial Misconduct, 3 S.F. L. REV. 244, 257 (1969). See also
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 93 (Braithwaite praises the California commission as both
"effective and efficient" on the ground that it "encourages judges to resign or retire and
thereby eliminates the time, expense and spectacle of a public trial in cases of serious misconduct").
I am uneasy with behind-the-scene maneuvers that "induce" or "encourage" or "motivate" resignation or removal. In Illinois, a judge may defeat the jurisdiction of the Courts
Commission by resigning either before the complaint is filed or before the Courts Commission
makes a decision. My inclination is to let the judge make the decision unaided by pressure
exerted by the Board.

46. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting L. Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLES'
MONEY 62 (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933)).
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Illinois system does. While the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment4 7 does not require it,' it is ancient wisdom that one ought not to be
accuser and judge in the same cause.
(7) In Illinois, the Courts Commission is permanently convened and
the same five judges (with an occasional alternate) hear all of the disciplinary cases en banc.
In California, much of the trial function is performed by a master or
masters, appointed ad hoc by the supreme court for the particular case. The
masters, who are judges or retired judges, submit findings of fact and
conclusions of law which may include a recommendation for discipline of
the judge or dismissal of the proceedings. The commission makes its
determination on the master's report and the objections thereto.
It seems to me that Illinois has a manifest advantage in the continuity of
service by the members of the commission, the expertise and sophistication
they acquire, and the consistency which this lends to their opinions.49 I do
not know how acute the problem may be in practice, but I should not like to
be responsible for "educating" new masters in each case to the peculiarities
of this corner of our jurisprudence.
PROBLEM AREAS IN THE ILLINOIS SYSTEM

The 1970 Constitution became effective July 1, 1971. The initial
membership of the Judicial Inquiry Board was filled on September 21,
1971, and the Board held its first meeting on October 6, 1971. However, its
first appropriations bill was not passed by the General Assembly and
approved by the Governor until May 26, 1972, and the Board began full
operation immediately thereafter. We have thus had approximately five
years of experience with the judicial disciplinary system. A discussion of
some of the principal problem areas which have been encountered by the
Board and the Courts Commission may be instructive.
Confidentiality
The Illinois Constitution provides that "[a]ll proceedings of the Board
shall be confidential except the filing of a complaint with the Courts
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. The United States Supreme Court has held that combining investigative and adjudicative functions does not necessarily create an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative
adjudication. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1976). However, a biased decisionmaker is
constitutionally unacceptable and "our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
49. Since the Courts Commission's decisions on pre-trial motions are unpublished and
difficult to come by, each respondent tends to "reinvent the wheel" in his case. Futile as it is,
counsel still wish to argue, for example, that a judge's off-the-bench behavior is no business of
the Judicial Inquiry Board, or that the constitutional standards are impermissibly vague or

84

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

50

Commission."
While the reach of the term "proceedings" is not altogether unambiguous, a sensible reading of this provision would accord
confidentiality to all those matters in which disclosure by the Board (except
through a complaint filed with the Courts Commission or other matters of
public record) would tend to make public accusations against a judge, or
reveal the fact that an inquiry or investigation is pending against a judge, or
serve to identify a lawyer or other person as the source of a complaint to, or
investigation by, the Board. It would seem equally consonant with the
manifest purpose of the provision that "confidentiality" does not extend to
the Board's rules, procedures or budget or inhibit public discussion of the
way in which the members of the Board view their mission.
There is an obvious need for confidentiality in the investigative phase
of the work of the disciplinary agencies. Without exception, all of the states
have a provision comparable to the one in Illinois requiring that the proceedings of the agencies shall be confidential at least to the point of filing a
complaint or the institution of formal proceedings. A judge's reputation is
not to be damaged by publicizing charges which are patently frivolous or
which, after investigation, do not afford a reasonable basis for complaint.
Confidentiality also serves the equally important purpose of protecting
against reprisal the persons who bring their grievances to the Board and
insures that the members of the agency may, in the investigative stage of the
proceedings, speak candidly and forthrightly among themselves.
But confidentiality is a two-edged sword. The most stringent set of
ethical standards is of little consequence unless the public is convinced that
the standards are uniformly and vigorously enforced. If I am correct in
suggesting that the ultimate value to be served by the disciplinary system is
the maintenance of a deserved public confidence in the judiciary, I am
disposed to believe that the Illinois system is preferable to the commission
form in which the alleged misconduct of the judge never surfaces until the
supreme court of the state has imposed a disciplinary sanction or an advisory
recommendation has been filed with the court by the commission.
Once the Judicial Inquiry Board has determined that a reasonable basis
exists to charge the judge, the complaint filed with the Courts Commission
is public, the hearing on the complaint is public, and the decision which the
commission makes is also a matter of public record. It may still leave the
public unsatisfied with respect to complaints publicized in the news media
but which the Board determines to be unworthy of complaint to the commisoverbroad. Members of the Courts Commission who have "heard all that before" are apt to
waste much less time in getting to the merits of the case.
50. ILL. CONST. Of 1970, art. VI, § 15(c).

ILLINOIS "TWO-TIER" SYSTEM

sion. But at least the public may be won to the confidence that when the
Board has determined that there is reasonable basis for complaint, the
alleged misconduct will not be swept under the rug. This is particularly
important in light of the Illinois experience in dealing with judicial misconduct and disability.
In fact, opening the complaint and the hearing to public scrutiny is not
an innovation in the 1970 Constitution. The rules adopted by the Supreme
Court of Illinois for implementation of the 1962 Judicial Article,5 1 whatever
their other shortcomings, provided that the complaint and the hearing should
both be public. 52 The committee appointed by the supreme court to draft the
original rule 59-253 reported, with the evident approval of the court, that:
The Committee gave considerable thought to the question of
whether the hearing should be public. At first there were serious
doubts of the wisdom of a public hearing on the ground that a
public hearing which resulted in the vindication of the judge might
nevertheless be so damaging to his position as to render him
ineffective and, in addition, subject him to undue personal embarrassment and abuse . . . . On balance, the Committee finally
concluded unanimously that in order to have the confidence of the
public in the effectiveness of the commission, which is an important reason for the inclusion of this provision in the Judicial
Article, it will be necessary to make the hearings public. 4
The emphasis I have placed on openness as a guarantor of the integrity
of the disciplinary process is thus not a new idea in Illinois. Confidentiality
and credibility are seldom compatible bedfellows in a democracy; public
confidence is generally ill-served by secrecy. Too often, as Edmund Burke
reminds us, "where mystery begins, justice ends."
I consider the fact that no mantle of secrecy or confidentiality obscures
the work of the Courts Commission or the postcomplaint performance of the
Board to be a particular virtue of the Illinois system. But the Board's
processes in that vast majority of investigations which do not result in the
filing of a complaint with the commission are subject to no such public
scrutiny. The Board, in fact, is virtually immune from informed criticism.
There seems to be no alternative that would not involve an unacceptable
sacrifice of the value of confidentiality in the Board's proceedings, a
requirement that necessarily prohibits any explanation of why the Board did
not, in a given case, find a reasonable basis for complaint or how the Board
has exercised its prosecutorial discretion. It does, however, leave the Board

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, § 51 (1965).
52. Id. § 51(c), (e).
53. This is former rule 59-2, adopted and effective May 18, 1964, with minor language
51.

changes. See also note 7 supra.
54. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 51(d) (Smith-Hurd 1968) (emphasis added).
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at the mercy of suspicion that it is not always as fiercely independent and
courageous as it would hope all judges to be.
The Sources from Which the Illinois JudicialInquiry Board May
Derive the Meaning of the Constitutional Standards
The Board is required by the constitution to determine whether a
reasonable basis exists to charge a judge with a violation of one of several
broadly defined species of misconduct. 55 They are expressed as "willful
misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform [the duties of the judicial
office] or other conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or
'.'.."56
that brings the judicial office into disrepute .
These words are, in truth, less definitions than invocations of spirit. A
criminal statute which defined prohibited conduct in such general terms
would manifestly be open to the challenge that it was constitutionally vague
and overbroad. There is ample authority, however, that in a disciplinary
context, as applied to lawyers and judges, the terms are not vulnerable to the
doctrine of overbreadth. Napolitano v. Ward57 furnishes, for Illinois, as
close to a conclusive precedent as one might be fortunate to find on any
constitutional question.
Richard A. Napolitano, a judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
was removed from office by the "old" Illinois Courts Commission on July
14, 1970. The charges against him stemmed from a Sangamon County
grand jury investigation into the purchase and sale of concession contracts at
the Illinois State Fair in which Napolitano was called as a witness but8
5
claimed the protection of the fifth amendment against self-incrimination5 9
and agreed to testify only after being granted immunity from prosecution.
The commission acted under the 1962 Judicial Article (the 1970 Constitution had not yet been adopted) which provided no more precise standard for
removal than the words "for cause."
55. ILL. CONSr. of 1970, art. VI, § 15(c).
56. Id. § 15(c)(1).
57. 317 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. III. 1970) (three-judge panel terminated for lack of constitution1970) (preliminary injunction denied), aff'd, 457 F.2d
alquestion) and 317 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. I11.
279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972), rehearingdenied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59. By March 19, 1970, when the complaint against Napolitano was filed, the supreme
court had adopted the rules change (June 27, 1969) which restructured the commission and the
lessons of recent history had obviously not been lost on either the supreme court or the
commission. The commission's decision in Napolitano came on July 14, 1970, while the debate
over "who judges the judges" was still raging in the constitutional convention then in session.
The commission found that there was clear and convincing evidence that Napolitano had
violated applicable Canons of Judicial Ethics including Canon 4 of the code adopted by the
Illinois Judicial Conference ("A judge's conduct should be free from impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety. . . and his personal behavior not only upon the bench. . . but also
in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach") and had given "cause," within the meaning
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On a claim by Napolitano that the words "for cause" were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, a three-judge panel of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found the contention to be
so lacking in merit as to raise no substantial constitutional question.
The words 'for cause' are, in our opinion, sufficiently definite
and are not overly broad and they therefore do not raise a question
of constitutionality of the Illinois constitutional provision and the
rule thereunder. The other matters raised by Napolitano pertain to
the application of the Illinois constitutional provision and the rule
thereunder and a determination of whether their application to him
was 'cause,' which in our opinion does not contemplate, or require, a three-judge decision. 6°
In a subsequent decision6 1 the district court refused any further examination of the argument that the "for cause" standard was constitutionally
vulnerable and quickly disposed of the other challenges Napolitano made to
the constitutionality of the removal proceedings. It said that while a judge
may invoke the fifth amendment, the "spectacle . .. is not a pretty one"
and might itself be cause for removal. 62 As to the use against Napolitano, in
the commission's proceedings, of his testimony compelled under grant of
immunity, the court held that the proceedings were not criminal in nature
and that there was no constitutional infirmity in the reliance on his grand
jury testimony. The court hearkened back to the pointed observation in
Jenkins v. Oregon State Bar63 that "[t]here is no divine right of judges to
flout the law."' Lastly it found that no evidence had been adduced to
support Napolitano's claim that the commission's decision had been based
upon his "ancestoral (sic), ethnic and vocational associations" in violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 65 The Court of
of the Illinois Constitution, for his removal from office. Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279, 282
& n.4 (7th Cir. 1972). He had refused to testify before the grand jury until granted immunity;
had used fictitious names in a scheme to acquire a large number of State Fair concession
contracts and sublet them, at a profit, to various concession stand operators; and had accepted
sums of money from a dairy firm to use his influence to secure a favorable location for it at the
fairgrounds. FIEDLER, supra note 2, at 426.
60. 317 F. Supp. 79,81 (N.D. Ill.
1970). Napolitano is instructive for a good many reasons
beyond its vindication of "for cause" as a standard for removal. In one way or another, before
every available judicial forum, Napolitano exhausted every conceivable objection to the constitutionality of the removal procedures. He filed a "purported appeal" to the Illinois Supreme
Court which the court rejected out of hand in an unsigned order, on the ground that no right of
appeal existed from the commission's decision. See FIEDLER, supra note 2, at 428. Another
attempted appeal to the United States Supreme Court was given the same short shrift in an
order dismissing it for want of a substantial federal question. 401 U.S. 95 (1971). He then
resorted to the proceedings in the United States district court. See text accompanying notes 6167 infra.
61. 317 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. I1. 1970).
62. Id. at 85.
63. 241 Or. 283, 405 P.2d 525 (1%5).
64. Id. at 291, 405 P.2d at 529 (cited at 317 F. Supp. at 85).
65. 317 F. Supp. at 85.
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed 66 and certiorari and a subsequent
67
petition for rehearing were denied by the United States Supreme Court.
If "for cause" is sufficiently definite to pass muster under the fourteenth amendment, such standards as "conduct that brings the judicial office
into disrepute" are surely no more vulnerable to challenge as vague or
overbroad. Indeed, the first commission convened by the Illinois Supreme
Court under the 1962 Judicial Article equated the words "for cause" with
"conduct unbecoming a judicial officer tending to bring the court system
into disrespect or disrepute. "68
Against this background, the Board, as early as its first meeting,
considered the sources to which it might look to inform and illuminate the
constitutional standards. It was not particularly dismayed by the fact that the
constitution had failed to provide some vade mecum of judicial behavior
against which it might determine when a judge was guilty of misconduct.
There is, of course, a vast body of literature on the subject, ranging from the
Bible, through Aristotle and Plato, to the various canons of judicial ethics
and codes of judicial conduct adopted by bar associations, judicial conferences, and the courts. None of it can serve to define everything that may
constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice or that brings
the judicial office into disrepute, notwithstanding the longing of judges, no
less than other human beings, for certainty in their daily comings and
goings. However, the Board was confronted by the fact that the same 1970
Constitution in which it finds its mandate provides that "the Supreme Court
shall adopt rules of conduct for Judges and Associate Judges.' '69
In January 1970 (in the wake of the 1969 "crisis of confidence" in the
judiciary and before the adoption of the 1970 Constitution), the court
adopted a commendable set of "Standards of Judicial Conduct"'7 drafted by
a committee headed by Dean John E. Cribbet of the University of Illinois
College of Law which it has apparently been content to have stand as
66. 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1972).
67. 409 U.S. 1037 (1972), rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973).
68. In re Murphy, Assoc. Judge of Circuit Ct. of Cook County, No. 1177 (I11. Cts.
Comm'n June, 1968).
69. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 13(a).
70. The standards are embodied in Supreme Court Rules 61 through 71. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110A, §§ 61-71 (1975). In view of the emphasis I have placed on public confidence in the
judiciary as the primary end of the disciplinary system, it is worth noting that the Cribbet
Committee struck the same theme in these eloquent words:
Public confidence in the administration of justice is an indispensable requisite of any
civilized society. The rule of law in a free society cannot long survive without public
trust in the competence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Public confidence
has been shaken by recent events on the national and state level and prompt efforts
must be exerted to restore and increase a deserved trust in the rule of law.
Judges as individuals are subject to all of the pressures on any man in public life
but judges as judges are in a class apart. They must avoid all impropriety and, more
difficult to attain, even the appearance of impropriety. Nothing less will suffice. The
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provision. 7

The standards are probably no more
compliance with this
precise, however, than the constitutional standards. From the standpoint of
"definiteness" there is not much to choose between an injunction to "avoid
the appearance of impropriety" and an injunction not to engage in "conduct
that brings the judicial office into disrepute."
The Board might conceivably have chosen to regard the supreme
court's rules as an exclusive compendium of all conduct that offends the
constitutional standards. There is, however, nothing in the 1970 Constitution to suggest that the mandate of the Board and the Courts Commission is
limited to the enforcement of whatever rules of conduct the supreme court
may adopt. Had that been the intention, it could have easily been expressed.
There would have been no need to speak of "conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice or that brings the judicial office into disrepute."
Indeed, the Report of the Judiciary Committee of the Convention says of the
constitutional standards that:
Although the standards may appear general, they are in fact
grounded in a long professional history of definition and application. The canons of judicial ethics promulgated by the National
and State Bar Associations, as implemented by ethical standards
established by courts, give adequate notice to judicial officers of
the kinds of conduct which are proscribed.'
The Board reached the conclusion, of which it gives notice in its rule 4(c)
that:
In determining whether a reasonable basis exists (to charge a
judge with "willful misconduct in office, persistent failure to
perform his duties, or other conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice or that brings the judicial office into
disrepute"), the Board may be guided by (but shall not be limited
to) the Standards of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Supreme
of the Supreme Court
Court of Illinois (Rule 61) and the rules
73
(Rules 62 through 71) related thereto.
This seems so sensible a reading of the constitution that I would hardly
characterize it as a "problem area" were it not for the fact that it has become
judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny and must conduct
himself accordingly. He must accept restrictions and prohibitions on his conduct
which might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen, and he should do this
freely and willingly. Otherwise, he should not seek the awesome responsibility of a
judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL

ETHICS I (1969).
71. The court has made a few relatively minor changes in the standards since adoption of
the Illinois Constitution of 1970, but has resisted the recommendations of the bar that it
integrate the standards with the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct. Illinois is
one of the very few states that has not adopted the American Bar Association Code of Judicial
Conduct.
72. VI PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 871 (1970).
73. ILL. JUDICIAL INQUIRY BD. R.P. 4(c).
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a focal point of attack by members of the judiciary. One critic (writing for
what I think is a readily identifiable constituency) attacked rule 4(c) as
"unconstitutionally vague," as "an undefined and undefinable rule of
substance," as representing "the greatest lack of restraint in modem history," and as an "emasculating threat to the independence of the
judiciary." 7 4 This criticism seems to evidence less scholarship than unreasoning hostility to the judicial disciplinary system.75
Neither the supreme court nor the Courts Commission, despite ample
opportunity to do so, has given an indication that the supreme court's rules
are the only legitimate source of inspiration in determining whether a judge
has been guilty of actionable misconduct. Nonetheless, the constitutional
standards are not self-defining and the judicial disciplinary process in
Illinois can benefit greatly from a body of doctrine developed in the case-bycase decisions of the Courts Commission.
Does the DisciplinarySystem Have "Jurisdiction" of Judicial
Misconduct which is Reviewable on Appeal?
It had not occurred to me until quite recently that any serious contention could be made that judicial misconduct was beyond the reach of the
disciplinary system simply because it might also constitute error reviewable
on appeal. Appellate review is so expensive and time consuming that it is
hardly a realistic remedy in cases in which little of monetary value is
involved but where a person has suffered the slings and arrows of judicial
rudeness, discourtesy and incivility, or the arrogant abuse of judicial power.
76
The issue has, however, come into sharp focus in the case of In re Harrod
and is worthy of attention.
It was charged by the Judicial Inquiry Board that Judge Harrod had in a
number of cases ordered defendants to have short haircuts (apparently on the
theory that long hair was an intolerable manifestation of an antisocial
attitude), and had required defendants sentenced to probation or conditional
discharge to surrender their driver's license to the probation officer who
would then issue a certificate to the defendant to the effect that the defendant
did have a valid driver's license which had been posted with a probation
officer during the period of probation or conditional discharge. The intended
effect was to identify the defendant as a probationer on any occasion in
which he was requested to exhibit his driver's license either to police
77
officers or to others.
74. Doherty, Judges Are Not Second-Class Citizens, 62 ILL. B.J. 274,275 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Second-Class Citizens].
75. For my response to Mr. Doherty's criticism, see Greenberg, Judges Are First Class
Citizens and a Good Deal More, 62 ILL. B.J. 378 (1974).
76. In re Harrod, No. 76-CC-3 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n December 3, 1976).
77. Id. at 7-8.
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The respondent strongly urged upon the commission, with the support
of a lengthy amicus brief by the Illinois Judges Association, that the
commission has no jurisdiction to entertain a complaint by the Judicial
Inquiry Board which charges a judge with improper conduct with respect to
78
the entry of an order subject to review by the ordinary appellate processes.
The Courts Commission acknowledged the fact that the judge's conduct was at least theoretically subject to review in the normal course of
judicial proceedings and the risk that the appellate or supreme court might
reach a conclusion with respect to this conduct at variance with the commission's view. But the commission equally recognized that "many serious
injustices may occur for which the right of appeal is not an effective
remedy." 7 9 It rejected the jurisdictional argument but announced, with
some caution, that it would "undertake to impose discipline based upon the
conduct of judges which is subject to review with ordinary judicial proceedings" only in the "clearest cases in which a gross abuse of judicial power
has been demonstrated.' "8
Implicitly finding that Judge Harrod's "haircut orders" and driver's
license cases presented one of those "clearest cases" of "gross abuse of
judicial power," the commission suspended him without pay for a period of
one month.
Judge Harrod then applied to the supreme court for leave to file "a
petition for writ of prohibition, or alternatively for writ of mandamus, or
alternatively for writ of certiorari" against the Courts Commission and the
five judges of the commission. 8 1 He was represented, on the motion, both
by the attorney who defended him before the Courts Commission and the
attorney who submitted the amicus brief to the commission on behalf of the
Illinois Judges Association. The supreme court initially denied the motion,
78. Id. at 2-3.
79. Id. at 10.
80. Id. It is not altogether clear what this means in the case of on-the-bench misconduct
such as rudeness and discourtesy, intemperateness, inattention, and a wide range of other
improprieties which may not affect the outcome of the litigation. Presumably the Courts
Commission's reference "to review with ordinary judicial proceedings" is intended to apply to
cases in which there is, in reality, a meaningful opportunity for appellate review.
81. Judge Harrod's motion for relief from the order of the Courts Commission, perhaps
only for good measure, also charged that the Board has "unconstitutionally seized powers
expressly withheld by the Constitution . . .and [has] exceeded its constitutional authority in
investigating the decisions of judges in the exercise of their judicial discretion," and that the
Board and the Courts Commission had no right to premise any complaint on misconduct which
was not violative of the Standards of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Motion for Leave to File a Petition for Writ of Prohibition, or Alternatively for Writ of
Mandamus, or Alternatively for Writ of Certiorari at 6, People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Cts.
Comm'n, No. 49118 (Ill. Dec. 1968). This is, of course, a reference to the Board's rule 4(c)
discussed in the text accompanying note 73 supra.
The rule 4(c) argument is hardly relevant in Harrod in view of the finding by the Courts
Commission that the judge's conduct specifically violated rule 61(c)(18) of the supreme court's
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but on reconsideration granted leave to file a petition for writ of man82
damus.
Judge Harrod's out-of-court reaction to his suspension seems to reflect
the same lack of insight into the limitations on judicial power in a democracy that brought him to the attention of the Judicial Inquiry Board in the first
place. Judge Harrod is reported as having told a Kiwanis Club that his
suspension "has intimidated every judge in the state;" that "every judge
who looks at a defendant is wondering, is he going to turn me in; is his
lawyer going to turn me in?" 83 "What it boils down to," Judge Harrod is
84
quoted as saying, "is that they didn't like the haircuts.",
ProsecutorialDiscretion and the "Station House Adjustment"
While the Illinois Constitution of 1970 says no more on this subject
than that a complaint may be filed by the Board whenever five of its
members believe that a reasonable basis exists to charge the judge with
misconduct or disability, 85 it is inescapable that the Board, in making that
determination, exercises "prosecutorial discretion."
The vast influence of the prosecutor in the pretrial criminal process,
characterized by one commentator as "largely unconfined, unstructured and
unchecked,"' has in recent years become an increasing concern in our
criminal justice system. "Selective" prosecutions and the grant of immunity to some guilty parties in aid of the successful prosecution of others are
facets of the great discretion to prosecute or not to prosecute, to charge a
serious offense or a lesser offense, to give one person a "pass" but to
"throw the book" at another. The element of prosecutorial discretion
cannot be eliminated from the Board's function, but it is important that the
exercise of this discretion shall not be completely "standardless." It must
not, in any event, be arbitrary or capricious or totally lacking in objectivity.
Given the necessarily imprecise nature of the constitutional standards
and the lacunae which must exist in any code of judicial conduct, the charge
Standards of Judicial Conduct which reads, in part, as follows: "In imposing sentence, a judge
should follow the law and should not compel persons brought before him to submit to some act
or discipline without authority of law, whether or not he may think it would have a beneficial
corrective influence ....
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, § 61(c)(19) (1975).
82. The initial denial was announced in a letter from the clerk of the supreme court to the
attorneys of record. Letter from Clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court to William J. Harte (Jan.
19, 1977). The subsequent order granting leave to file an application for a writ of mandamus was
similarly announced. People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Cts. Comm'n No. 49118 (II1. March 16,
1977). On November 30, 1977, the writ was awarded, People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Cts.
Comm'n, No. 49118 (I1. November 30, 1977). See text accompanying notes 120-160 infra.
83. Peoria Journal Star, Jan. 5, 1977, § E, at 1,col. 4.
84. Id.
85. ILL. CONST. of 1970, Art. VI, § 15(c).
86. See, e.g., Friedman, Some Jurisprudential Considerations in Developing an Administrative Law for the Criminal Pre-Trial Process, 5 J. URBAN L. 433, 435 (1974).
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that a judge may be accused of misconduct "on nothing more than [the]
subjective notions of current members of the Board"" 7 is not altogether
lacking in credibility. While I have already paid my respects to what I think
is the wholly specious contention that the standards are unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad, the fact remains that the Board's prosecutorial discretion holds a potential for abuse, not only from the standpoint of the judges
but, even more importantly, from the standpoint of the public interest.
It is no more likely that the Board can be justly accused of excessive
zeal than of undue caution and timidity. But the fact that the charging
decision is effectively shielded from public scrutiny by the requirements of
confidentiality is an anomaly in the disciplinary system. Overzealousness on
the part of the Board is correctable by the Courts Commission; passivity and
timidity may not even come to public notice.
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the Board is complicated by
the fact that the constitution gives it no express authority to impose any
sanction, public or private, upon a judge. I consider it extremely doubtful
that any such power can be read into the constitution by implication. There
is a sentence in the Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Convention"8 that lends some credence to the idea of station house adjustments. It says: "Indeed the Committee envisions the informal resolution of
many complaints by understandings reached with the judge or magistrate
which are adequately remedial and where there will be no cause to proceed
to a formal complaint." The constitution does not, however, reflect this
vision and I do not regard it as a warrant for the imposition of sanctions,
formal or informal, by the Board. In any event, what is "adequately
remedial" must obviously be measured by how well or how poorly "understandings reached with the judge or magistrate" serve the ends of the
disciplinary system.
Certainly a public reprimand or censure by the Board would fly
directly into the teeth of the confidentiality of the Board's proceedings.
However, even a private reprimand or censure, or a demand that the judge
acknowledge his fault to the Board and promise to "sin no more," is a
sanction that must be premised on a finding that the judge has in fact been
guilty of conduct that is proscribed by the constitutional standards.
It is my view that the imposition of any sanctions by the Board would
be an impermissible usurpation of the authority vested in the Courts Commission. It would, moreover, require the fashioning of a new procedure to
afford an adversary hearing, rights of confrontation and cross-examination,
etc., in dealing with any investigation which might result in imposition of a
87.
88.

Second-Class Citizens, supra note 74, at 274.
VI PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

870 (1970).
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private reprimand or censure, for I am convinced that no sanction, private or
public, is permissible unless it is firmly grounded upon a finding of guilt.
Notwithstanding all of this, it is repeatedly urged upon the Board that it
ought to avoid filing complaints by resorting to what is accurately, if
inelegantly, sometimes called the "station house adjustment." There are, of
courie, many instances of aberrant behavior brought to the attention of the
Board which do not rise to the dignity of misconduct deserving of reprimand
or censure. In such cases it is appropriate that no complaint should be filed
by the Board. It is, however, in most such instances, also unnecessary that
the Board administer some formal warning or admonishment. The point is
seldom lost upon a judge who is called upon to explain his conduct to the
Board.8 9
I would probably have no irreconcilable objection to station house
adjustments if I could be reasonably certain that the Board's discretion will
be properly exercised. I think that the Board is on safer ground, however, if
it continues to avoid the dubious temptation to embark upon informal
remedies of its own invention and draw a fairly rigid line between conduct
which it believes offends the constitutional standards and conduct which it
believes does not. In the former, a complaint should be filed; in the latter,
the Board really has no constitutional authority to act. I confess that I regard
the value of disclosure of judicial misconduct as so central to the judicial
institution that I view with some suspicion any suggestion that tends to
compromise it. The public will inevitably regard it with even greater
suspicion. And that, too, is part of the Illinois experience to which the
Judicial Article of the 1970 Constitution is addressed.
I have no facile solutions to this problem of the Board's prosecutorial
discretion. It is the one place in the disciplinary system in which the public
must trust blindly not only the integrity but the individual perceptions of the
members of the Board. If the fates are kind, these perceptions will be as
informed and "educated" as possible; and the Board will find that full
measure of self-discipline, courage, toughmindedness and good judgment
without which the system will not work. It is a fairly sizeable order.
"Due Process" in the Board's Proceedings
The Illinois Judges Association has repeatedly urged that the filing of a
complaint, without a hearing before the Board at which the judge under
investigation is accorded the right to counsel, confrontation and crossexamination, violates the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitu89. Where, however, the judge persists in his belief that his conduct was proper, a private
admonishment will serve no useful purpose. On the whole I think the view of theologians that
there can be no redemption without "conviction of sin" may be right.

ILLINOIS "TWO-TIER" SYSTEM

tion. 9° The argument disregards the difference between a complaint and a
judgment, and fails to distinguish between the Board's function as an
investigative-charging agency, and the Courts Commission's function as the
sole decision-maker with respect to any action that can be said to deprive the
respondent of a property or liberty interest.
The judge is, of course, afforded the full panoply of adjudicative due
process in the de novo hearing before the Courts Commission. However, he
is not also entitled to the same rights before the Board so long as the Board is
prudent enough to limit itself to its constitutional investigative and prosecutorial function and does not seek to usurp the powers of the commission by
imposing sanctions on the judge. The question does not, in my judgment,
present a serious constitutional issue.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Hannah v.
Larche9' and Jenkins v. McKeithen9l firmly establish the distinction between investigatory proceedings and adjudicatory proceedings insofar as
procedural due process is concerned. We need not be reminded that "due
process" is not a magical incantation. As the Supreme Court said in
Hannah, due process is an elusive concept that
embodies the differing rules of fair play which, through the years,
have become associated with different types of proceedings.
Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in
a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The
nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding,
and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations
which must be taken into account. 93
Hannah was concerned with the validity of procedures adopted by the
Federal Commission on Civil Rights 94 created by the Civil Rights Act of
195795 and with the requirements of due process as applied to the proceedings of the commission. The Court held that persons summoned to testify in
an investigation by the commission, who were targets of the investigation,
were not entitled to the safeguards of apprisal, confrontation, and crossexamination which are traditionally associated with adjudicatory proceedings.
The Supreme Court's characterization of the Civil Rights Commission
in Hannah is entirely apt when applied to the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board:
90.
process
91.
92.
93.
flexible
481).
94.
95.

"[NIor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
363 U.S. 420 (1960).
395 U.S. 411 (1969).
363 U.S. at 442. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) ("due process is
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Id. at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-1975(e) (1970).
Id.
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It does not adjudicate. It does not hold trials or determine
anyone's civil or criminal liability. It does not issue orders. Nor
does it indict, punish, or impose any legal sanctions. It does not
make determinations depriving anyone of his life, liberty, or property. In short, the Commission does not and cannot take any
affirmative action which will affect an individual's legal rights.
The only purpose of its existence is to find facts which may
subsequently be used as the basis for legislative or executive
action. 96
The Court, after an extensive survey of the procedures traditionally
followed by investigating agencies, concluded that:
We think it is fairly clear from this survey of various phases
of governmental investigation that witnesses appearing before
investigating agencies, whether legislative, executive, or judicial,
have generally not been accorded the rights of apprisal, confrontation, or cross-examination. Although we do not suggest that the
grand jury and the congressional investigating committee are identical in all respects to the Civil Rights Commission, we mention
them, in addition to the executive agencies and commissions
created by Congress, to show that the rules of this Commission
are not alien to those which have historically governed the procedure of investigations conducted by agencies in the three major
branches of our Government. 97
98
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Hannah in Jenkins v. McKeithen.
Mr. Justice Harlan's description in his dissenting opinion in Jenkins of
certain federal administrative agencies and the offices of prosecuting attorneys seems also to furnish an apt description of the Illinois Judicial Inquiry
Board:
None of [these agencies] is the final arbiter of anyone's guilt
or innocence. Each, rather, plays only a preliminary role, designed, in the usual course of events, to initiate a subsequent formal
proceeding in which the accused will enjoy the full panoply of
procedural safeguards. For this reason, and because such agencies
could not otherwise practicably pursue their investigative functions, they have not been required to follow "adjudicatory" procedures.99
One may concede that while the Board adjudicates nothing, the mere
fact of filing a complaint with the Courts Commission may, in the eyes of
the press or the public, damage the respondent judge in a way which may
not be fully repaired even if the Courts Commission "acquits" him. I think
that this risk is exaggerated, 1° but at any rate it is not a reason for
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
without
Several

363 U.S. at 441.
Id. at 449.
395 U.S. 411 (1969).
Id. at 439 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
A substantial number of judges who have been reprimanded, censured, or suspended
pay by the Courts Commission are alive and well and still occupy judicial office.
of them have been retained in office by popular vote and one or two may even have
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emasculating the investigative and prosecutorial process so long as the judge
is entitled to his day in court and a fair trial before the Courts Commission.
In this, as in other aspects of our society, we must rely, as the United States
Supreme Court observed in United States v. Ash, 101 upon the "ethical
responsibility of the prosecutor, who, as so often has been said, may 'strike
hard blows' but 'not foul ones.' "102
Even if it were true that the filing of a complaint by the Board
irreparably damaged the judge's good name, reputation and opportunity to
be retained or reelected, it would have to be accepted as an "occupational
hazard" of judicial office. It would implicate no "liberty" or "property"
interest "sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the 'Due Process
Clause.' "103 So long as no sanction can be imposed upon the judge except
by the Courts Commission after a de novo adversary hearing in which he is
afforded adjudicatory due process, even a temporary suspension with pay
pending the decision of the commission does not offend the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 104
Notwithstanding the protestations of the Illinois Judges Association to
the contrary, the Board has, in my opinion, accorded to the judges a full
measure of the due process rights which are appropriate to the nature of its
proceedings. The Board has indeed gone beyond the requirements of due
process by imposing upon itself, under its rule 4(d), 10 5 a requirement that
before it proceeds to a determination that a reasonable basis exists for the
filing of a complaint, the judge shall be given
notice of the substance of the proposed charge and an opportunity
to appear before the Board (accompanied by counsel if the Judge
so elects) to make such statement or give such information, oral or
written (including the names of any witnesses he may wish to have
heard by the Board), in respect to the proposed charge as he may

desire. 106

Against the background of Illinois political and judicial history, the
persistent demand that the Board hold an adversary trial-type hearing cum
apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examination before it may even file a
complaint with the commission, engenders a suspicion that it stems less
from any conviction that this is required by the due process clause than by
become folk heroes in their communities as the result of the confrontation with the Courts
Commission. It is to be hoped, however, that they are better judges by reason of the experience. In any event, I find no empirical evidence in Illinois that disciplinary action short of

removal has irreparably harmed a judge's reputation or significantly affected his opportunity
for continued employment.
101. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
102. Id.at 320.
103. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
104. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974).
105.

ILL. JUDICIAL INQUIRY BD. R.P. 4(d).

106. Id.
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the knowledge that it would cripple the Board's ability to perform its
investigative function. I do not suggest that due process should be measured
out grudgingly or that the Board should not go beyond the requirements of
the fourteenth amendment and the Illinois Constitution if there were a
compelling need to do so. But to yield to the demand to convert the two-tier
system into a "two-trial" system would, in Shakespeare's words, be "some
love but little policy."
AFTER FIVE YEARS-A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT

There is, here, a dilemma. On the one hand, having written at length a
statement about the history and structure of the Illinois judicial disciplinary
system, I may justly be asked to make some assessment, tentative and
personal as it may be, of how well the system has worked in its first five
years of operation. On the other hand, the requirements of confidentiality,
and a decent regard for the sensibilities of my colleagues on the Judicial
Inquiry Board, inhibit the frankness and candor which I should like to bring
to the subject. No effort at redaction or excision in discussing "proceedings" of the Board would be apt to save me from embarrassment if I should
inadvertently cross the fine line between what is appropriately confidential
and what is not. I shall, nonetheless, but with what I hope is a forgivable
degree of circumspection, make an effort at a personal (I stress the word
personal) assessment of the performance, thus far, of the Illinois disciplinary system.
The Judicial Inquiry Board
On the whole, the Board has functioned better than I had anticipated
and not as well as I had hoped. The performance during the five years has
been uneven. The Board got off to a good start. 0 7 Considering that it was
writing on a clean slate, with no significant precedent for the implementation of a two-tier system, it did an excellent job of getting organized,
adopting rules of procedure, and charting a path for its administration. The
Board has already had a profound impact in heightening the expectations
and awareness by the judiciary of what is expected of judges in their
behavior both on and off the bench.
It is, however, my judgment that the Board is far from having accomplished its full potential. It has shown no great flair or imagination in
107. However, not without some initial trauma. The antireform forces, led by the loyalists
of the Chicago Democratic party machine who had failed to abort the judicial disciplinary
system in the constitutional convention, almost succeeded in killing the baby at birth. On one
pretext or another the Illinois Senate managed to withhold an appropriation for the Board until
the concluding moments of the legislative session in May 1972. Only a vigorous campaign in the
news media saved the day. See COHN, supra note 2, at 154, and FIEDLER, supra note 2, at 431.
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carrying out its mission. On the whole, it has tended, perhaps as a function
of too limited a staff, to react to specific complaints which it receives, rather
than to initiate sua sponte inquiries into broader problems of judicial conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Nobody, least of all I, has a
desire to turn loose a small army of snoopers on fishing expeditions into
judicial behavior. I would resist any such course even if the Board had an
unlimited budget and inexhaustible staff. The mischief caused by undue
invasion of the privacy of judges would far exceed any benefit that might be
derived from it. While judges, by accepting judicial office, sacrifice a good
deal of the right to privacy in their personal affairs which other citizens
enjoy, they have a right to be free of unnecessary intrusions by the Board.
But there is a strong need for systematic monitoring of courts in which the
Board has reason to believe that the judges are consistently falling short of
the requirements of the Illinois Standards of Judicial Conduct10 8 and the
American Bar Association Code. 109 The Board has yet to establish an
adequate capability for that task.
In particular, the Board has shown no observable vigor in carrying out
that part of its constitutional mission that calls upon it to determine when
judges have become "physically or mentally unable to perform [their]
duties." 110 It is, of course, a most disagreeable task. Unlike blatant judicial
misconduct, the misfortune of illness, the lot of all humankind, can only
arouse sentiments of sympathy and compassion. But it is necessary to
temper these feelings with an understanding that it is right that a judge who
can no longer perform his duties shall leave the office lest the business of the
courts, already intolerably overcrowded, should suffer and an undue burden
be cast upon his brethren. Here, again, a systematic monitoring capability
should be established. As it is, the Board's first knowledge that a judge is
physically unable to perform his duties is often derived from an obituary
notice that reports that he has passed away after a long and lingering illness.
As of the end of 1976, the Board had taken twenty complaints to the
Courts Commission. In nineteen of these cases, the commission imposed
some measure of discipline ranging from reprimand to removal from office. 111 The fact that the Board has successfully prosecuted so large a
percentage of its complaints is not, to my mind, necessarily cause for
congratulation. It may bespeak not only diligent and careful preparation, but
too excessive a degree of caution. The Courts Commission is, of course,
powerless to act except upon the Board's initiative, and if the Board "plays

108.
109.
I10.
111.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, §§ 61-71 (1975) (Sup. Ct. Rs. 61-71).
American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct (adopted Aug. 16, 1972).
ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 15(c)(2).
See Appendix B.
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it too safe," the cause of improving the moral and ethical perceptions of
what judges "ought" to be, may be disserved. The Board ought not to have
a prosecutor's concern about "batting averages."
The Courts Commission
Anything like an adequate study of how well the Courts Commission
has functioned is beyond the necessary limitations of this article. But I make
these observations:
If I have any disappointment in the performance of the Courts Commission, it lies with the fact that it has shown little emotion or passion for its
task. I recognize that "emotion" and "passion" are not usually commendable qualities in a judge. I mean it here only in the sense that the commission
has apparently viewed the task as a disagreeable one to be performed with a
minimum of rhetoric rather than as an opportunity, by example and precept,
to help establish a climate of heightened expectations by the community of
judges about their own conduct, and the consequences of violation of
fundamental norms of judicial behavior. I sense that the commission regards
the disciplinary system as a kind of necessary nuisance to be dealt with
justly but not overly warmly or with great enthusiasm. At any rate, I doubt
that the commission as a whole feels as strongly about the values of
disclosure as I do.
There was a time when I believed--even in the field of judicial
ethics-with Dr. Ernst Freund, one of my law school teachers, that "[n]ot
every standard of conduct that is fit to be observed is also fit to be
enforced."' 12 Surely that made sense when Dr. Freund wrote it sixty years
ago and is by now a virtual commonplace. Why, then, a zeal for "enforcement" of all ethical standards that are "fit to be observed?" The answer
lies, I think, in the word "enforcement," which, in Dr. Freund's formulation, implies punitive sanctions to compel adherence to a moral code. I am
not really interested in the punitive aspects of sanctions for misconduct; my
concern is with the effect that exposure of judicial misconduct, and its
public disapprobation, can have in reinforcing the moral constraints and
113
sensibilities which must bind the community of judges.
To say that "not every standard of conduct

.

.

.

fit to be observed is

also fit to be enforced" is to assume that there exists so great a consensus
112. E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 106 (1917).
113. Even a case in which the Courts Commission refuses the imposition of any sanction
against the judge may serve a salutary purpose. In In re Pistilli, the Judicial Inquiry Board
complained that the judge had made statements during a hearing that were "inconsiderate of
and discourteous to, and were such as to embarrass and ridicule," a young attorney who
appeared before him. The Commission, while holding that the judge's conduct, as an "isolated
instance," did not call for disciplinary measures, stated that the "conduct was far from
exemplary and is not to be condoned ......
In re Pistilli, No. 76-CC-4 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n
1977).
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about the validity and value of the standards of judicial conduct that they
need no longer be taught; that deviance is sufficiently rare to be tolerated
with a degree of equanimity. I regret to say that I do not find this to be true.
Deviance from what ought to be universally accepted norms of judicial
conduct is often unblushing and aggressively defended as the "right" of
judges to be free of restraints that do not also apply to their fellow citizens. I
fear that in Illinois we are still in an "educative" process. Perhaps when that
process has borne fruit, the Board may safely be more permissive in the
exercise of its prosecutorial discretion.
I have on occasion thought that the measure of discipline imposed in a
particular case was inadequate, but I have no criticism of the Courts
Commission in that regard. Like the problem of "sentencing" in a criminal
case, perceptions about what is appropriate are apt to differ widely. It is
uniquely the commission's responsibility," 4 and I hope that I have made it
clear that my primary concern is with the teaching function of the commission's decisions, not with the particular measure of discipline the commission may see fit to assess. Most of the commission's orders (opinions) are,
however, remarkably spare and lean and contain little of preachment or
exhortation. It is my hope that the commission will, in time, become less
sparing in its opinions, perhaps taking note of the rather comprehensive
opinions written by the supreme courts of states such as California in which
the supreme court is the ultimate decisionmaker.
The relationship between the Board and the commission has, quite
properly, not been a "cozy" one. The Board and the commission have
scrupulously refrained from any dialogue, not only about a particular case
but even about the philosophy of the judicial disciplinary system. I like to
think that a healthy but amiable tension ought to exist between the Board
and the commission. "Tension," not in the sense of strain, but in the way in
which one speaks, in the context of a musical composition or of a symphony
orchestra, of the "tension" between the string section and the basses. The
Board and the commission each has its own role to play but with equal
dedication to a common purpose. Both have a responsibility for giving a
degree of moral leadership in the area of judicial ethics.
CONCLUSION:

A WORD

OF ADVICE TO PROSPECTIVE APPOINTEES TO

BOARDS OR COMMISSIONS IN THE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM1 1 5

In conclusion, I venture to offer a word of advice to all well-intentioned
lawyers, non-lawyers or judges who are asked to serve as members of a
114. The Courts Commission has made it clear to the Board that it neither invites nor
considers appropriate, recommendations by the Board as to the measure of discipline.
115. Nothing in this section implies anything at all about my colleagues on the Illinois
Board.
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board or commission in the judicial disciplinary system, and who may have
the option of accepting or declining the appointment. A letter to them might
run as follows:
If you accept appointment to serve as a member of a board or commission within a judicial disciplinary system, remember, please, that it is an
enormously difficult task which is apt to yield you more heartache than
satisfaction.
The task you are about to undertake requires a selfless and dispassionate seeking after truth and justice of which not all men and women are
equally capable. It is, in fact, one of those tasks that Emerson may have had
in mind when he wrote in one of his essays: "God offers to every mind its
choice between truth and repose. Take which you please; you can never
have both. Between these, as a pendulum, man oscillates. He in whom the
love of repose predominates . . . gets rest, commodity, and reputation; but
' 116
he shuts the door of truth.
Of ihe non-lawyers particularly, I would ask you not to assume that all
that is required of you is the exercise of your native common sense. There is
a vast body of literature on the subject of judicial ethics and norms of
judicial behavior in which you ought to be as well read as possible. No one
expects you to become a lawyer (quite the contrary-you were appointed
because you are not a lawyer) or to master all that has been written on this
subject. Nobody has or will. But you have a responsibility to be as "informed" and "educated" as possible.
Justice Roger J. Traynor of the California Supreme Court, writing of
non-lawyer representation on a judicial nominating commission, said some
interesting things that are, perhaps, even more pointedly applicable to
service on a disciplinary board or commission:
I should . . . welcome some representatives of the public.
They would not be a Willy or a Miss Minnie who happened to
know a governor and little else. The best one can postulate would
be citizens of high enough intelligence to comprehend their legal
colleagues and of wide enough experience to electrify the legal
atmosphere with a few insights from the nonlegal world. They
could inaugurate a modern tradition of public service that would
do the Republic proud..117
Justice Traynor's reference to Willy and Miss Minnie may require some
clarification:
Willy and Miss Minnie are personifications of elements of public
opinion. Willy is the nebulous "People's Will" described as "irresponsible" because of his "provincial or partisan notions" and
116. Emerson, Essay on Intellect, reprinted in G. SELDES, THE GREAT QUOTATIONS at 921.
117. Traynor, Who Can Best Judge the Judges, 53 VA. L. REV. 1266, 1278 (1967).
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his "emotional bias." His opposition is a "native lady who has
collected miniatures for so long that she is known as 'Miss Minnie.' " A very vocal member of the "artistic" community, "in the
name of freedom," she intends to "enlist the people on her side"
in judgment by popular standard rather than by the law." 8
Do not be dismayed by the fact that words like "conduct that brings the
judicial office into disrepute" may seem terribly loose; nor terrified that the
injunction to avoid not only "impropriety" but the "appearance of impropriety" does not lend itself to easy application. It is the task of the
disciplinary agency to help breathe life and meaning into these words. If it
could be done by a computer, there would be little need for your service.
The responsibility you have is surely not a light one. But do not let that,
in athletic parlance, cause you to "choke" on difficult decisions. And do
not expect a neatly packaged precedent on "all fours" with every case you
are called upon to decide. The genius of our jurisprudence is that law is
made by the slow accretion of precedent, and precedents are made, case-bycase, by those who are not content to contemplate the past but reach into the
future. Were it not for generations of lawyers and judges who have sought to
vindicate principles for which there was no legal precedent (yes, even in the
teeth of existing precedent), our common law would be infinitely poorer
than it is. Give some scope to your imagination and conscience; you may
"win some and lose some" but the law of judicial discipline will be
enriched by it.
To all of you, the non-lawyers, lawyers and judges alike, I offer this
counsel: be not overly self-righteous, but neither be so tolerant of human
frailty as not to recognize that what may be overlooked in the conduct of
ordinary citizens may be a menace in a judge. The halls of justice are not a
market place, and the ethical responsibilities of judges are not those of the
tradesman. Perhaps it is particularly demanded of the non-lawyer member,
who may be a hardheaded businessman, that he understand that the pragmatism he practices in his business is not an acceptable standard in judging the
conduct of judges. Willy's ready acceptance of what he may regard as
"par" for a cruel and imperfect world is not good enough for the disciplinary system.
Compassion and sympathy are surely great moral virtues. But I beseech
Miss Minnie not to comfort herself by dispensing her own brand of tea and
sympathy at the expense of the rigorous self-discipline and respect for law
which are incumbent upon those who would serve in the disciplinary
system.

118. G. Winters, Preface to AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, SELECTED READINGS, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE

(1973).
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While I do not doubt the wisdom of including lawyers in the composition of judicial disciplinary agencies, the position of the lawyer-member,
particularly when he is engaged in active practice, is fraught with obvious
special difficulties. Lawyers who are uneasy about the possibility of losing
popularity with the judges of their community would do well to avoid the
task of judging the judges. In any event, they may from time to time reflect,
ruefully, on the cynical advice of Ecclesiastes, "be not righteous overmuch,
neither make thyself wise; why shouldest thou destroy thyself ... ."119
As to judge members, it is hardly necessary to say that their role is not
as servants of a particular constituency. Their constituency is the people, the
judicial institution, and the love we bear to the ideal of equal justice under
law. For them too, perhaps for them particularly, the task of judging their
peers is not a pleasant one. But if we are to have judicial self-regulation, in
part or in whole, the task must be performed with a punctilio of honor that
transcends personal considerations.
A POSTSCRIPT-THE HARROD
CASE

Shortly after this article went to print, the Illinois Supreme Court
1 20
decided the case of People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Courts Commission
which bears importantly on a number of the issues which are discussed in
the preceding text. In the Harrod case the Courts Commission found that
Judge Harrod had repeatedly sentenced defendants, as a condition of probation or conditional discharge, to undergo short haircuts as a punishment for
what he regarded as a manifestation of an anti-social attitude. 121 It held that
in so doing the judge had acted so far beyond his statutory or common law
authority as to be guilty of a gross abuse of judicial power. It determined
that this misconduct violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 61(c)(18) 122 and
was cognizable by the Judicial Inquiry Board and the Courts Commission
under section 15 of article VI of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. 123 Judge
Harrod was suspended from his judicial duties for a period of one month
without pay.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted Judge Harrod's petition for leave to
file for a writ of mandamus. 124 It has now ordered that a writ of mandamus
119. Ecclesiastes 7:16.
November 30, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Harrod]. For the earlier
120. No. 49118 (I11.
proceedings in the Harrodcase, see the text accompanying notes 76-84 supra.
121. Judge Harrod testified that he regarded long hair as "a symbol of defiance for the
Cts. Comm'n December 3,
In re Harrod, No. 73-CC-3 (I11.
rights of everybody else .....
1976) at 7.
122. Rule 61(c)(18) provides in pertinent part as follows: "In imposing sentence, a judge
should follow the law and should not compel persons brought before him to submit to some act
or discipline without authority of law, whether or not he may think it would have a beneficial
.. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 61(c)(18) (1975).
corrective influence ....
123. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI §§ 15(c), (e). See Appendix A.

124. See notes 81-82 supra.
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issue against the members of the Courts Commission, directing them to
expunge the suspension order from their records.
In the course of its opinion the court acknowledges that the 1970
Constitution mandates that the court is to have no involvement in the judicial
disciplinary system's investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions; 125 that unlike the pre-1970 Courts Commission, the Judicial Inquiry
Board is completely independent of the court and its administrative director
and staff; 2 6 that the present Courts Commission is vested with the sole
adjudicative function in the judicial disciplinary system; 127 that the commission's decisions are final and nonreviewable; 128 that the supreme court may
not concern itself with the "correctness of the Commission's determination" ;129 that the commission clearly had jurisdiction of the subject matter
of the complaint against Judge Harrod; 130 that the fact that a judge's
misconduct may be remedied by appeal does not prevent the same conduct
from being the subject of a disciplinary action or deprive the Board and the
commission of jurisdiction; 131 and that the doctrine of judicial immunity is
not automatically applicable merely because an act is committed while a
32
judge is performing in a judicial capacity. 1
These principles would seem, at least abstractly, to comport closely
with the views on these points which I have expressed in this article. My
expectations as to the outcome of Harrod, however, have been considerably
deflated.
I am not certain that this postscript can in itself do justice to the Harrod
decision and therefore I ask that this article be read pari passu with the
court's opinion. It is perhaps as well that my pre-Harrodoptimism about the
independence of the Illinois judicial disciplinary system should remain to be
contrasted with what I perceive to be the reassertion by the supreme court of
judicial control over the system.
Although it concedes that the 1970 Constitution provides that the
decisions of the Courts Commission shall be final and nonreviewable, the
court rests its jurisdiction by way of a writ of mandamus against the
members of the Courts Commission on a distinction between a review
125. Harrod, slip op. at 12.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id.at 16.
131. "Although all misconduct arising during the course of a judicial proceeding may be the
subject of an appeal, an individual defendant's vindication of personal rights does not necessarily protect the public from a judge who repeatedly and grossly abuses his judicial power." Id. at
15.
132. Id.
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of the "correctness of the Commission's determination[s]" (which the
court acknowledges to be beyond its purview) and a determination of the
scope of the commission's constitutional authority. "It is the function and
duty of this court to act as the final arbiter of the Constitution" and hence
the court "has both the authority and responsibility to determine whether the
Commission's acts were beyond its constitutional grant of authority
",133

The proposition that every governmental agency, including the Courts
Commission, should be accountable to somebody for an abuse of its constitutional authority to act is attractive to one who, like the author, is
committed to the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men.
It is, however, an imperative of the rule of law that judicial review, in the
guise of policing constitutional boundaries, should not be the means of
constitutional policymaking or "amending" the constitution. 13 4 It should
also be remembered that there is no fundamental or due process requirement
that the decisions of a judicial disciplinary commission should be appealable
or subject to review by the courts. Even in criminal cases there is no
of constitutional or
absolute right of appeal or judicial review independently
135
appeal.
such
allowing
provisions
statutory
If the Illinois Supreme Court, in Harrod, intends no more than is
comprehended by its responsibility to police the constitutional boundaries of
the Courts Commission's jurisdiction, its right to do so is, I think, unchallengable. If, on the other hand, it is really creating a species of judicial
review of the commission's decisions, it has itself exceeded its constitutional authority. The consequence is particularly grave because the supreme
court's decision in Harrod is, of course, not appealable to or reviewable by
any other judicial tribunal. It is appropriate to recall Justice Stone's dictum
that "the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of
136
self-restraint."
Accepting that it is the supreme court's right to police the constitutional
boundaries of the commission's authority, we may ask in what way did the
commission so grievously exceed its jurisdiction as to justify the issuance of
a writ requiring it to expunge its order? The writ of mandamus was not
133. Id. at 6.
134. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 249 (1977).
135. "A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however
grave the offence of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law and is not now a
necessary element of due process of law." McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). See
also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
136. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (dissenting opinion). Raoul Berger's
question is also apt: "How long can public respect for the Court, on which its power ultimately
depends, survive if the people become aware that the tribunal which condemns the acts of
others as unconstitutional is itself acting unconstitutionally?" R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY 410 (1977).
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issued because the commission lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Nor was
it issued for lack of a finding that Judge Harrod had been guilty of repeated
violations of a specific rule, rule 61 (c)(18) of the supreme court. Rather, the
commission's fatal transgression in the eyes of the court is that it undertook
to construe and interpret the statute upon which Judge Harrod relied as
ostensible authority for his "haircut orders." The point requires some
elucidation.
Section 5-6-3 of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections 137 provides
in part (as set forth in the supreme court's opinion in Harrod):
"(a) The conditions of probation and of conditional discharge shall be that the person:
(1) not violate any criminal statute of any jurisdiction;
and
(2) make a report to and appear in person before such
person or agency as directed by the court.
(b) The Court may in addition to other conditions require
that the person: *** [the section thereafter sets forth 10 other
permissible conditions].' 138
Judge Harrod contended that the haircut orders were one of the unenumerated "other conditions" authorized by the Code. In essence, his
submission was that the phrase "in addition to other conditions" gave him
139
lawful authority to impose any conditions he might think proper.
The Board offered two constructions of the statute, one that the word
"other" simply referred to the two mandatory conditions set forth in section
5-6-3(a) of the Code, making the ten permissible conditions additional to the
two mandatory conditions. Alternatively, the phrase "other conditions"
meant conditions additional to the two mandatory and the ten permissive
conditions, but of the same type as the ten itemized conditions and directly
related to the offenses involved. 14o
The commission rejected both the literal interpretation of section 5-63(b) for which the respondent contended and the alternative constructions
offered by the Board. It adopted instead a "sensible construction" which
would require that any "additional conditions" should be directed toward
rehabilitation, but reasonably related to the offense, and not be unduly
restrictive of personal liberties. 14' So evaluated, the haircut orders were held
137. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3 (1975) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the
Code].
138. Harrod, slip op. at 3.
139. Id. In rejecting this contention, the Courts Commission said that it is "certain . . .

that the General Assembly did not intend by its reference to 'other conditions' to confer upon
each judge unbridled authority to impose whatever conditions he might see fit." In re Harrod,
No. 76-CC-3 (I1. Cts. Comm'n December 3, 1976) at 9.
140. Harrod, slip op. at 3-4.
141. In re Harrod, No. 76-CC-3 (Ill.
Cts. Comm'n December 3, 1976) at 10.
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by the commission to be without authority of law and a gross abuse of
42
judicial power. 1
By the time the commission made its decision in Harrod the Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fourth District in People v. Dunn 143 had reversed
one of Judge Harrod's haircut orders and had construed section 5-6-3(b) as
permitting conditions other than those specifically enumerated in the Code
but only if there was "some connection between the condition and the crime
charged."44 It held that there was no connection between the length of the
defendant's hair and personal appearance and the traffic offense (failure to
signal) with which he was charged. The court reversed Judge Harrod's
haircut order and remanded the case. It also called attention to Illinois
145
Supreme Court Rule 61(c) (18).
The distinction between (1) the construction of the statute in People v.
Dunn (that "some connection" between the condition and the offense is
required); (2) the second of the alternatives offered by the Board (that the
condition of probation or conditional discharge be directly related to the
offense and of the same type as the ten enumerated permissible conditions);
and (3) the commission's own "sensible construction" (that the condition
be directed to rehabilitation, reasonably related to the offense and not unduly restrictive of personal liberties) seems to be an exceedingly fine one.
They all have in common a requirement that the condition of probation or
conditional discharge bear some reasonable relationship to the offense.
Under any of these constructions an order that traffic offenders have their
hair cut short in the style preferred by Judge Harrod is without authority of
law.
Nonetheless, the court holds that in adopting its own "sensible construction" of section 5-6-3(b) of the Code the commission usurped a
function committed exclusively to the judiciary. The court said that "[tihe
function of the Commission is one of fact finding. Its function in this case
was to apply the facts to the determined law, not to determine, construe or
interpret what the law should be.' ,46 Because the commission, "in determining whether [Judge Harrod's] orders were without authority of law
• . .applied its own independent interpretation and construction of sec142. Id. at 12. The commission said that the haircut orders obviously bore no relationship
to the offenses committed by the defendant. Id. at 11.
143. 43 I11.App. 3d 94, 356 N.E.2d 1137 (1976).
144. Id. at 96, 356 N.E.2d at 1138.
145. Id.
146. Harrod, slip op. at 17. The concept of "determined law" is, I am afraid, somewhat
simplistic. Not very much of our "laws" can be said to be so determined that they do not
require interpretation, construction or the resolution of ambiguities. Even the supreme court's
decision in Harrod will require some interpretation and construction by the Board and the
Courts Commission to determine both its breadth and its limitations.
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tion 5-6-3(b) to [Judge Harrod's] conduct," its suspension order is void.' 47
That holding is, quite literally, the fulcrum of the supreme court's decision.
The constitutional boundaries of the commission's jurisdiction obviously
rest upon a very delicate balance.
There is another, and from my point of view an even more regrettable,
aspect of the Harroddecision. The supreme court holds that "only conduct
violative of the Supreme Court Rules of judicial conduct may be the subject
of a complaint before the Commission;"' that the supreme court is "vested with the exclusive authority to promulgate rules of judicial conduct for
judges of this State;"' 149 and that the constitutional standards set forth in
section 15(c)(1) "were intended to serve only as a guide to the Board in
determining whether an alleged violation of rules warranted the filing of a
formal complaint." '5
With all respect, this seems to me to set the constitution on its head. If
it were intended that a complaint against a judge could be grounded only on
a specific rule of the supreme court, it would have been easy to so provide in
the constitution. The supreme court reads the majority report of the
Judiciary Committee of the Constitutional Convention as saying that "although the standards [appear] general, the canons of judicial ethics, implemented by the courts, give judicial officers adequate notice of the kinds of
conduct proscribed." 51 It attributes to the committee a recognition of "the
need for greater specificity" and says that the committee "deliberately
52
referred judicial officers to the court-adopted rules on judicial conduct." 1
I suggest that the court has misread the "legislative history." The
framers did indeed recognize a need for "specificity" (not "greater specificity") and they supplied this need by spelling out in the constitution the
standards of "willful misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his
duties, or other conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or
that brings the judicial office into disrepute." These are the standards and
there is no indication in the majority report of the judiciary committee that
the definition of what is judicial misconduct would be referable to "courtadopted rules."
The majority report actually reads as follows:
Of major importance is the requirement that a complaint filed
by the Inquiry Board be based upon a determination that a reasonable basis exists that the judge or magistrate has violated the
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.

Id.
Id.at 14.
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standards noted, namely wilful misconduct in office, persistent
failure to perform his duties, conduct prejudicialto the administration of justice, or other conduct which brings the judicialoffice into
disrepute. If a complaint is based upon physical or mental disability, the reasonable basis must relate to inability to discharge duties.
The specification of standards is intended to prevent or minimize
a 14th Amendment due process challenge that the provisions are
void for vagueness, and to eliminate a discretion in the Inquiry
Board to file complaints on hasty, ill advised, or inadequate premises. By compelling the Inquiry Board to focus upon the standards
and the existence of evidence relating to those standards, it is
believed that the Board will become neither accusatorial nor inquisitorial in an improper manner. These provisions are especially
important for the guidance of the lay members of the Board whose
experience in matters of this kind will be more limited than the
judicial and lawyer members. Indeed the Committee envisions the
informal resolution of many complaints by understandings reached with the judge or magistrate which are adequately remedial and
where there will be no cause to proceed to a formal complaint. In
these, as in other instances, the standardswill be both helpful and
necessary.
Although the standards may appear general, they are in fact
grounded in a long professional history of definition and application. The canons of judicial ethics promulgated by the National
and State Bar Associations, as implemented by ethical standards
established by courts, give adequate notice to judicial officers of
the kinds of conduct which are proscribed." 3
The committee's emphasis is wholly upon the "standards noted,"
upon the "specification of [these] standards," and upon the requirement
that the Board "focus upon [these] standards and the existence of evidence
relating to these standards." All of those terms refer to the constitutional
standards. Nowhere is there a suggestion that a violation of the supreme
court's rules should be the exclusive warrant for a complaint of judicial
misconduct or that every complaint should somehow be indexed to a
specific rule. II Such a requirement is both unworkable and an invasion of
the independence of the judicial disciplinary system.

153. VI PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 870-71 (1970) (emphasis added).
154. The idea expressed in the last paragraph of the quotation from the majority report (see
text accompanying note 153 supra) is remarkably similar to the statement of Judge Bartels in
Sarisohn v. Appellate Division, 265 F. Supp. 455 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), which held that the "for
cause" standard of the New York Constitution was not unconstitutional for vagueness:
It would be impossible to enumerate in any statute all the possible grounds and
circumstances justifying the removal of a judicial officer. Guidelines may be found in

the Canons of Ethics, applicable to both attorneys and judges, adopted by the
American Bar Association and other bar associations, and also in the general moral
and ethical standards expected of judicial officers by the community.
Id. at 458. For good measure, Judge Bartels quoted Luke 12:48: "For unto whomsoever much
is given, of him shall be much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him they
will ask the more." Id. at 458 n.2.
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Judicial misconduct does not lend itself to reduction to a set of formularies in a kind of pharmacopoeia cast in rules of the supreme court.155
Nor do any implications of due process or equal protection require any
greater precision in defining judicial misconduct than is supplied by the
constitutional standards. The supreme court in Harrod suggests that the
constitutional standards, "standing alone, could be subject to a successful
constitutional attack. '"156 I submit that this is incorrect. If "for cause,"
standing alone, is not subject to constitutional attack,15 7 the constitutional
standards are no less adequate to any due process challenge. There is
ample precedent that the words "conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice or that brings the judicial office into disrepute" are not subject to
158
challenge as vague or overbroad.
My sense of disappointment with the direction the supreme court has
taken in Harrod is, I suppose, altogether too obvious. I was present at the
birth of the Illinois judicial disciplinary system created by the 1970 Constitution. I may even claim some small part in what I perceived as the
struggle to free the system, as completely as possible, from control by the
judiciary. That was, after all, the point of the debate over "who shall judge
the judges"-a debate in which, as the supreme court acknowledges, "the
[Judiciary] Committee and convention delegates expressly indicated that
this court was to have no involvement" in "the judicial disciplinary sys159
tem's investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory functions .
155. "Precisely what 'conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice' is or may
be, in any or all circumstances, we shall not undertake to say. Indeed, a comprehensive,
universally applicable definition may never evolve but it is unlikely we shall ever have much
trouble recognizing and identifying such conduct whenever the constituent facts are presented." In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 671, 304 A.2d 587, 594 (1973), cert. denied sub nom.
Broccolino v. Maryland Comm'n on Judicial Disabilities, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
Even if it were possible to provide, by rule, an exhaustive compendium of what constitutes
judicial misconduct, the supreme court has shown little alacrity for such a task. There has been
no significant change in the Standards of Judicial Conduct which pre-date adoption of the 1970
Constitution. Illinois remains one of the few states which have failed to adopt the American Bar
Association Code of Judicial Conduct. See note 71 supra.
156. Harrod, slip op. at 14.
157. See Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. 11. 1970) (three-judge panel terminated for lack of constitutional question) and 317 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (preliminary
injunction denied), aff'd 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972), rehearing
denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973). See text accompanying notes 55-68 supra.
158. The most recent of a long line of cases to this effect is In re Nowell, - N.C. -, 237
S.E.2d 246 (1977) in which the court said:
We have previously said without elaboration . . . that the phrases quoted above
[willful misconduct in office or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
that brings the judicial office into disrepute] are not unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad. We now point out that they are '[no] more nebulous or less objective than
the reasonable and prudent man test which has been a part of our negligence law for
centuries.'
Id. at -, 237 S.E.2d at 251 (citations omitted). See also text accompanying notes 55-68 supra;
Greenberg, Judges Are First Class Citizens and a Good Deal More, 62 11. B.J. 378, 379-81
(1974).
159. Harrod, slip op. at 12 (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
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If the finality attached to the decisions of the Courts Commission by the
1970 Constitution must yield to the revisory power of the supreme court
whenever the commission undertakes to interpret or construe a statute or the
common law in the process of determining whether a judge has abused his
authority; if no complaint may be made by the Board or entertained by the
commission unless the conduct is violative of a rule of the supreme court; if
the constitutional standards have no force except as a guide to whether there
has been a violation of court-adopted rules, the independence of the disciplinary system may prove to be more apparent than real.
I may perhaps be forgiven if I say that the Harrod opinion gives me a
certain sense of deja vu, or that in the Illinois experience with judicial
discipline, as in other facets of the political life of this state, the French
160
proverb may apply: plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
160. The more it changes, the more it is the same thing.
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APPENDIX A
EXCERPT FROM ARTICLE VI OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION OF

1970

§ 15. Retirement-Discipline
(a) The General Assembly may provide by law for the retirement of
Judges and Associate Judges at a prescribed age. Any retired Judge or
Associate Judge, with his consent, may be assigned by the Supreme Court to
judicial service for which he shall receive the applicable compensation in
lieu of retirement benefits. A retired Associate Judge may be assigned only
as an Associate Judge.
(b) A Judicial Inquiry Board is created. The Supreme Court shall
select two Circuit Judges as members and the Governor shall appoint four
persons who are not lawyers and three lawyers as members of the Board. No
more than two of the lawyers and two of the non-lawyers appointed by the
Governor shall be members of the same political party. The terms of Board
members shall be four years. A vacancy on the Board shall be filled for a
full term in the manner the original appointment was made. No member may
serve on the Board more than eight years.
(c) The Board shall be convened permanently, with authority, to
conduct investigations, receive or initiate complaints concerning a Judge or
Associate Judge, and file complaints with the Courts Commission. The
Board shall not file a complaint unless five members believe that a reasonable basis exists (1) to charge the Judge or Associate Judge with willful
misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, or other
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that brings the
judicial office into disrepute, or (2) to charge that the Judge or Associate
Judge is physically or mentally unable to perform his duties. All proceedings of the Board shall be confidential except the filing of a complaint with
the Courts Commission. The Board shall prosecute the complaint.
(d) The Board shall adopt rules governing its procedures. It shall
have subpoena power and authority to appoint and direct its staff. Members
of the Board who are not Judges shall receive per diem compensation and
necessary expenses; members who are Judges shall receive necessary expenses only. The General Assembly by law shall appropriate funds for the
operation of the Board.
(e) A Courts Commission is created consisting of one Supreme Court
Judge selected by that Court, who shall be its chairman, two Appellate
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Court Judges selected by that Court, and two Circuit Judges selected by the
Supreme Court. The Commission shall be convened permanently to hear
complaints filed by the Judicial Inquiry Board. The Commission shall have
authority after notice and public hearing, (1) to remove from office, suspend
without pay, censure or reprimand a Judge or Associate Judge for willful
misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, or other
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that brings the
the judicial office into disrepute, or (2) to suspend, with or without pay, or
retire a Judge or Associate Judge who is physically or mentally unable to
perform his duties.
(f) The concurrence of three members of the Commission shall be
necessary for a decision. The decision of the Commission shall be final.
(g) The Commission shall adopt rules governing its procedures and
shall have power to issue subpoenas. The General Assembly shall provide
by law for the expenses of the Commission.
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APPENDIX B
TABLE I

Disposition of Cases by the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board
1971-1976
1971
Files Disposed of (Note 1):
-because information did not
10
survive preliminary screening
-- after a minimal investigation
(evident that no reasonable basis exists
for complaint to Courts
1
Commission)
-- after extensive investigation
(determination that no reasonable
basis exists for complaint to Courts
Commission)
0
-by complaint to
Courts Commission
0
TOTAL 11

Total

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

55

46

58

72

67

308

25

28

51

52

41

198

5

13

17

27

16

78

1
86

6
93

6
132

4
155

4
128

(Note 3)

21
605

(Note 2)

Note 1:

The figures for "files disposed of" do not include a great many communications
received by the Board which dealt with matters so obviously beyond its jurisdiction
or which were so patently frivolous as not to justify "opening a file."
Note 2: Includes as one, two complaints against one judge which were consolidated for
hearing by the Courts Commission.
Note 3: As of December 31, 1976, 32 files were pending before the Board.

TABLE II

Disposition of Cases by Illinois Courts Commission
1971-1976
Complaints
Filed by
Judicial Inquiry Board

21"

Decisions Imposing Discipline (Total 17)
Reprimand
4

Censure
3

Suspension
Without Pay
7

Mooted by
Resignation
Dismissed
Pending
During Pendency on Finding
as of
of Complaint for Respondent 12131/76

Removal
3

- one
two
four
six
one
month
months months months
year
3
1
1
1
1
*
Includes as one, two complaints filed against the same judge which were consolidated
for hearing by the Commission.

